


JPRS-TAC-92-031
28 October 1992



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

Arms Control

Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-92-031

CONTENTS

28 October 1992

CHINA

- Text of Foreign Minister's UN Address Published [*Qian Qichen; RENMIN RIBAO 25 Sep*] 1
- Spokesman Confirms 25 Sep Underground Nuclear Test [*Tokyo KYODO 4 Oct*] 2

EAST ASIA

JAPAN

- Tokyo Supports UN Conventional Arms Monitoring [*KYODO 7 Oct*] 3

EAST EUROPE

HUNGARY

- Military Delegations Discuss Open Skies Accord [*MTI 5 Oct*] 4

POLAND

- Withdrawing Soviet Army Actively Trading Hardware [*ZYCIE WARSZAWY 2 Oct*] 4

NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

EGYPT

- Defense Minister on Security, Arms Control [*M. Tantawi; UKTUBAR 4 Oct*] 5

IRAN

- UN Envoy Announces Support for CW Convention Despite Reservations [*IRNA 15 Oct*] 6

ISRAEL

- Near East Balance Said Upset by Bush, Beijing [*Z. Schiff; HA'ARETZ 22 Sep*] 7
- Arrow Missile Project's Merit Questioned [*R. Pedatur; HA'ARETZ 1 Oct*] 8
- 'Astonishment' at SDI Plan To Defend Israeli Territory [*HA'ARETZ 5 Oct*] 9
- Germany To Finance Third Patriot Battery [*YEDI'OT AHARONOT 6 Oct*] 10

SYRIA

- Foreign Minister Links CW, Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaties [*Damascus TV 2 Oct*] 10

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

GENERAL

- Nuclear Weapons Designer Interviewed [*S. Voronin; DELOVOY MIR 12 Sep*] 11
- Plutonium-Producing Krasnoyarsk Reactor Shut Down 16
- Country's Last Single-Flow Weapons Reactor [*ITAR-TASS 29 Sep*] 16
- Environmentalists Object to Plans for Waste Dump [*Moscow TV 6 Oct*] 16
- Deputy Minister at Tokyo Symposium on Defense Nuclear Conversion [*ITAR-TASS 5 Oct*] 16

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

START Ratification Would Enhance Process [M. Ponomarev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 1 Oct]	17
Russian Spokesman Hails U.S. START Ratification [Moscow International 2 Oct]	17
Experiment in Explosive Elimination of ICBM Silos [A. Dolonin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 7 Oct] ..	18
Republics' Role Said 'Complicating Factor' in START [B. Belitskiy; Moscow International 8 Oct]	19

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Ukraine, Russia Disagree Over Control of Space Facilities [Moscow TV 4 Oct]	20
---	----

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Transcaucasus Deputy on Reducing Military District [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 29 Sep]	20
2d Group of Russian Troops Withdrawing From Moldova [INTERFAX 30 Sep]	21
Reports on Russian Troop Pullout From Lithuania	21
First Equipment Shipments Depart [IZVESTIYA 1 Oct]	21
Landsbergis Reports Progress [ELTA NEWS BULLETIN 8 Oct]	21
Lithuanian, Russian Envoys Confer [ELTA NEWS BULLETIN 12 Oct]	22
Estonian Defense Minister Optimistic About Russian Troop Withdrawal [Tallinn Radio 1 Oct] ..	22
Russian Troop Withdrawal From Poland To Be Completed Early [ITAR-TASS 2 Oct]	22
Permission Required for Russian Units To Transit Latvia [BALTFAX 6 Oct]	22

NUCLEAR TESTING

Ecologist Warns of Upcoming Nuclear Tests [ITAR-TASS 30 Sep]	23
Grachev: Novaya Zemlya Nuclear Tests May Resume [ITAR-TASS 13 Oct]	23
Parliamentarians Inspect Novaya Zemlya Site [INTERFAX 13 Oct]	23

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Continued Russian Work on Binary CW Alleged [V. Mirzayanov, L. Fedorov; MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI 20 Sep]	24
Mutual Biological Warfare Concerns Pondered [A. Golts; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 29 Sep]	26
West Said To 'Hoodwink' Russian on BW Concerns [V. Kasyn; PRAVDA 6 Oct]	28

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

Russian Defense Ministry: Kurils Troop Withdrawal To Proceed [Tokyo KYODO 30 Sep]	29
---	----

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Bomb: Cheapest Way to Avoid War [Y.A. Trutnev; IZVESTIYA 19 Aug]	30
Shaposhnikov Urges Russian Control of Nuclear Arms	34
Speaks at Paris Defense Ministers' Conference [Moscow Radio 30 Sep]	34
Ukraine Objects to Statement [INTERFAX 8 Oct]	34
Tatarstan Declares Republic Nuclear Free Zone [INTERFAX 2 Oct]	34
Ukraine Rules Out Use of Strategic Nuclear Forces [ITAR-TASS 2 Oct]	35
Ukraine Briefs U.S. Official on Nuclear Policy [ITAR-TASS 6 Oct]	35
CIS Bishkek Summit Meeting Discusses Nuclear Forces	35
Grachev, Shaposhnikov Outline Issues [INTERFAX 7 Oct]	35
Shaposhnikov Reviews First Day [INTERFAX 7 Oct]	36
Kravchuk 'Satisfied' on Nuclear Forces [INTERFAX 8 Oct]	36
Shaposhnikov Assumes CIS Strategic Command [INTERFAX 9 Oct]	36
Status of Ukrainian Arms 'Undecided' [INTERFAX 9 Oct]	36
Ukrainian Objections Explained [Kiev TV 9 Oct]	37
Kyrgyzstan's Akayev Views Summit [Tokyo KYODO 11 Oct]	37
Shaposhnikov News Conference [INTERFAX 12 Oct]	37
Further on News Conference [INTERFAX 12 Oct]	38
Belarusian Chairman Comments [Moscow TV 12 Oct]	38
U.S.-Belarus Nuclear Arms Removal Accord in Jeopardy [INTERFAX 10 Oct]	38

WEST EUROPE

FRANCE

Premier Favors Closer Nuclear Ties With UK [Paris Radio 1 Oct]	39
Prime Minister Says France Opposes 'Star Wars'	39
Sees 'Unacceptable Risk' [AFP 1 Oct]	39
Further Report [LE MONDE 3 Oct]	39

UNITED KINGDOM

Defense Secretary Addresses Strategic Conference in Paris [PRESS ASSOCIATION 30 Sep]	40
--	----

Text of Foreign Minister's UN Address Published
HK3009121392 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
25 Sep 92 p 6

[Full Text of address by Qian Qichen, Chinese state councillor and foreign minister, to the 47th United Nations General Assembly on 23 September: "Foreign Minister Qian Qichen Addresses 47th UN General Assembly"]

[Excerpts] United Nations, 23 Sep (RENMIN RIBAO)—Mr. President:

First of all, please allow me to express my heartfelt congratulations to you on becoming president of the current General Assembly. I believe that with your talent and experience, you are sure to succeed in guiding the current General Assembly to perform the sublime duties assigned by the UN Charter. I would like to express appreciation and thanks to Mr. Shihabi [xi ha bi 1585 0761 3024], president of the last General Assembly, for his contribution to the accomplishment of its work.

I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to extend a warm welcome and congratulations to the 13 new member states that the United Nations has admitted this year, namely, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, San Marino, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

Since the last UN General Assembly, the world situation has undergone profound changes, and major events have been happening continuously from the east to the west and from the south to the north. The international community has finally extricated itself from the old pattern, which was characterized by the confrontation between two military blocs, and the world has entered a new stage of historical development leading toward multipolarity.

The past mirrors the present. The tortuous experience of mankind in this century, especially following World War II, has brought to light a historical truth: Any large country, no matter how powerful it may be, will turn into its opposite if it acts counter to the people's aspirations for peace and demands for development. World peace, national stability, social progress, economic development, and improvement of livelihood have all along been the shared aspiration of all peoples. No force on earth can resist this historical trend.

Genuine peace—which was anticipated by people the world over—did not come automatically with the end of the "cold war." Because the balance of power is seriously uneven, old contradictions are interwoven with new problems, and armed conflicts are breaking out one after another, the world is still not very peaceful. Hegemonism and power politics still exist. The attempts of some major powers to control developing countries politically and economically have become more and more obvious. The conflicts between nationalities that were covered up

for a long time are standing out sharply, and the problems between the South and the North are becoming ever more serious. The road to peace and development, which has been taken by the people throughout the world, is beset with difficulties.

One can see that a dangerous "seismic zone" extending from the Balkans to the Caucasus and to Central Asia has now taken shape. The people in some regions are once again living in the raging flames of war and the resultant turmoil and chaos. Millions of refugees are fleeing in hordes in all directions. These conflicts are happening in areas of traditionally mixed ethnic settlements, and the contradictions that have accumulated over a long period of time are surfacing under new circumstances. It is interwoven with historical rancor, connected with territorial disputes, and also mingled with such factors as political struggle, economic interests, and religious disputes. The involvement of external forces has complicated the problems.

We believe that, no matter how complicated a problem is, resorting to force is not the right choice in the search for a final settlement. The fundamental solution lies in the effort to realize reconciliation among different nationalities through dialogue on an equal footing and peace negotiations. It is our ardent wish that the parties to these conflicts will, considering the overall importance of safeguarding peace and the interests of the people, abandon the use and threat of force and settle disputes through friendly consultations and political negotiations on equal footing in the spirit of mutual respect, harmony, and shared development. [passage omitted]

Mr. President, in recent years, the United States and Russia have reached some new agreements on the reduction of nuclear weapons. The international community welcomes this and hopes that the countries concerned will substantially implement these agreements. In the meantime, one can also see that, even when these disarmament measures are completed, the fact that the military powers possess the biggest and best nuclear arsenals, sophisticated weapons, and the capabilities for developing space weapons will remain unchanged.

The international convention on chemical weapons was finally concluded after years of negotiations, which laid an international legal foundation for eliminating this type of weapon of mass destruction on a worldwide scale. Though some parts of this pact are marred by inadequate fairness and balance, its goals and objectives have met with the international community's unanimous approval and support. We hope these goals and objectives will be observed and implemented with substantial efforts so as to contribute to the security of all countries.

China has always stood for the banning and thorough eradication of all weapons of mass destruction. Before this ultimate goal is achieved, for the sake of world and regional security and stability, it is necessary for the international community to adopt the measures that are

necessary and appropriate, as transitional expedients, to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We maintain that the international efforts toward nonproliferation should follow the principles of justice, rationality, comprehensiveness, and balance and should not harm various nations' just security interests, impair their economic and social development, or impede international cooperation aimed at the utilization of science and technology for peaceful purposes.

We stand opposed to a certain country [you de guo jia 2589 4104 0948 1367], on the pretext of preventing proliferation of weapons, interfering with and hindering normal modes of cooperation between sovereign countries. We strongly condemn the act of brazenly violating the pledge this country itself made in an international agreement, by selling large quantities of advanced weapons and equipment and wantonly interfering in another country's internal affairs.

On the issue of disarmament and arms control, we would like to make the following suggestions:

- All countries possessing nuclear weapons should promise not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and, unconditionally, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against countries that do not have nuclear weapons.
- All countries possessing nuclear weapons should support the proposition for establishing nuclear-free zones, respect the status of existing nuclear-free zones, and undertake the corresponding duties. Countries

which have deployed nuclear weapons abroad should withdraw all of them into their own territories.

- All countries with outer space capabilities should abide by the principle of utilizing outer space for peaceful purposes, stop the research, experiments, production, and deployment of outer space weapons immediately, and refrain from introducing weapons systems into outer space. [passage omitted]

Spokesman Confirms 25 Sep Underground Nuclear Test

OW0410123092 Tokyo KYODO in English 1144 GMT 4 Oct 92

[Text] Beijing, Oct. 4 KYODO—A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman confirmed Sunday [4 October] that China has recently conducted a underground nuclear test.

It was China's second nuclear test this year.

The spokesman made the confirmation after an inquiry from KYODO NEWS SERVICE.

An Indian nuclear center earlier announced it detected a Chinese underground nuclear test on the scale of a 15-kiloton TNT blast on September 25.

Western military sources in Beijing estimate that a May 11 nuclear test was a strategic nuclear explosion of one-megaton and last month's test was a tactical nuclear blast.

JAPAN

Tokyo Supports UN Conventional Arms Monitoring

OW0710145192 Tokyo KYODO in English 1440 GMT
7 Oct 92

[Text] Tokyo, Oct. 7 KYODO—The government has decided to join Britain and several other countries in sponsoring a United Nations General Assembly resolution urging support for a report compiled by a UN working group on monitoring the transfer of conventional arms, officials said Wednesday.

The monitoring of weapons movements would begin by the end of April 1993 if the report is adopted this year.

The report would not be binding, but many nations see it as a first step toward the control of conventional weapons.

Japan's ambassador to the conference on disarmament, Mitsuro Donowaki, will put Japan's case for supporting the resolution at the meeting of the UN First Committee which begins Monday.

The committee deals with disarmament and related international security questions.

A UN working panel has already agreed that the supply of weapons from the United States to U.S. bases in Japan would not be defined as a "transfer of weapons."

It also decided to add mine sweepers and missile launching boats to a list of seven "weapons" for reporting which comprises tanks, armored cars, large aperture cannons, fighter planes, attack helicopters, destroyers and battleships.

Cuba refused to support the move when it was first decided to establish the system in the UN last year, while China and Vietnam did not participate in the vote.

HUNGARY

Military Delegations Discuss Open Skies Accord*LD0510212992 Budapest MTI in English 1829 GMT
5 Oct 92*

[Text] Budapest, October 5 (MTI)—For the Open Skies agreement to be implemented, signatory countries want to form a joint monitoring system, based on Canadian, Danish, and Russian experience, military delegation heads said on Monday [5 October].

At Hungary's Tokol and Kiskunlachaza airfields, the delegations saw shows of aircraft equipped with various devices enabling close observation of ground objects. A four-day conference to discuss ways to realise an international monitoring system under the Open Skies agreement opened in Budapest on Monday, with experts from 17 countries.

The Open Skies agreement was signed by 25 countries, including Hungary, in March, to enable NATO and former Warsaw Pact member states to mutually monitor each other's territories from the air. An obstacle to implementing the agreement was the difference between countries' radar systems. At this conference, with U.S. support, the countries will form a joint system acceptable to all.

With modern equipment, tank movements can be observed in the worst weather from a height of 10 km in a 150-km wide area. Technical parameters for the system are to be worked out in Hungary with Canadian support. It is expected to start operation next year to put the Open Skies agreement into practice. This will be important for preserving peace as members will be unable to start military preparations undetected.

POLAND

Withdrawing Soviet Army Actively Trading Hardware*AU0610142292 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish
2 Oct 92 p 3*

[By Bogna Swiatkowska and Piotr Wysocki: "Army Trade"]

[Text] The withdrawing Soviet forces can sell their fuel and hardware only to firms that have trade concessions. But they are not too careful with choosing their partners. Some of the firms with which the Russians have been wanting to do or have already done business do not have a good reputation.

Colonel Jerzy Lotkowski, government plenipotentiary responsible for Soviet Forces in Poland, tells us that the Polish authorities handed representatives of the Soviet Forces a list of 24 firms that have been granted concessions for trade in fuels and hardware.

In the middle of July 1992, the Russians gave Col. Lotkowski's office a list of 16 firms with which the former USSR Forces in Poland were willing to do business.

The Polish authorities questioned this list because some of the firms on it were of dubious integrity. The firms in question had declared a desire to trade with fuels, but most of them did not hold the necessary concessions.

Even so, the Russians insisted on cooperating only with the firms on their list. They included the "Metronom" foreign enterprise from Siedlce Voivodship. Supreme Chamber of Control records say that this firm was involved in the so-called ruble affair.

Another firm, "Robinson" of Wroclaw, which currently has a concession to buy movable assets from the withdrawing forces, appears in customs records as a firm that lied about the value of the fuel it acquired from the Russians (21.6 billion zlotys worth).

The "Russian" list also contained the firms "Wojtysiak Holding" and ATS, which made a name for themselves in the so-called rifle scandal. Most of ATS' shareholders are currently in German jails awaiting extradition to the United States. "Holding" appears on the Polish list as a firm authorized to draw up inventories of facilities left behind by the Soviet forces.

The Russians also wanted to cooperate with the "Free Trade Zone" firm in Legnica. This firm was founded by Tadeusz Pokrywka, voivode of Legnica and a Democratic Party deputy; Mieczyslaw Baszowski, deputy mayor of Legnica; and a French firm.

"Free Trade Zone" never got off the ground because the founders had failed to obtain the government's permission. It was meant to be active in areas occupied by the Red Army. Nevertheless, using official firm stationery and papers signed by Irmino Bochen, a deputy from the Alliance of the Democratic Left, the firm's French partners cheated Western banks out of several hundred thousand dollars. The entire affair was reported as the Deco Bank scandal.

Another firm, Center East-West, is indirectly linked to "Wojtysiak Holding." Firms belonging to Andrzej Arendarski, minister of foreign economic cooperation, have shares in Center East-West.

No one knows exactly how much the assets handed over by the departing Russian forces are worth. The chief of the Office of the Council of Ministers recently ordered voivodes on whose territory Russian units were present to prepare draft inventories of these assets. The Russians claim the total value of these assets is \$300 million.

EGYPT

Defense Minister on Security, Arms Control

NC1010170092 Cairo UKTUBAR in Arabic
4 Oct 92 pp 3-7

[Interview with Defense Minister General Muhammad Husayn Tantawi by editor in chief Salah Muntasir—date and place not given]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Muntasir] There are several issues of concern to us that we cannot discuss without noting the effects of the new world order on them. They include the issue of security arrangements and the elimination of mass destruction weapons from the region. Let us begin with the security arrangements, particularly considering the new ideas that emerged in this respect as a result of the Gulf crisis.

[Tantawi] The security arrangements, in essence, provide a formula that reflects various political, economic, and military measures adopted for a strategic purpose to ensure security and stability for a certain country or a regional system. From a broader perspective, they constitute the framework for safeguarding world security and peace. These measures are normally taken through bilateral or collective agreements among countries. In the past, these security measures were organized with a view to maintaining stability and safeguarding areas of influence and interest by means of establishing political blocs, alliances, and military bases. The concept later evolved to include political, economic, and military dimensions to cope with modern requirements. They now include agreements, charters, and treaties, such as the treaties for nuclear nonproliferation; chemical and biological weapons bans; arms limitation, control and inspection systems; buffer zones; areas with limited number of military personnel, etc. What concerns us about this concept is that it was raised in connection with the Gulf crisis and the increasing need to reconfigure the Arab security order in a way that could safeguard stability in one of the most vital areas for world security and peace. The Gulf crisis has indeed revealed the need to revise the structure and mechanism of the region's security order. Since Egyptian national security is linked to Arab security—a fact that is unquestionable—Egypt hastened along with the powers concerned in the region to draft a comprehensive formula that could achieve and meet the minimum requirements of security and stability, in accordance with the circumstances of the current stage. We believe in every regional country's right to build its own defensive capabilities to preserve its security, which is a legitimate right. But because of demographic considerations and the nature of the threats facing the region, the confrontation of which goes beyond the capabilities of any single country, collective action becomes a legitimate framework for countries to build their capabilities to face threats in this regard. It is therefore logical that some regional countries, particularly Arab countries, can join in, should individual capabilities fall short of the requirements of

the confrontation. Egypt, with its role, cultural and demographic importance, unique geographic location, and potential elements of power in view of its Arab, Islamic, and African affiliations, is qualified to play an active role in preserving and maintaining security in this framework. One thing that cannot be disregarded is the fact that the region possesses strategic Arab resources and passageways. Accordingly, the powers that have interests may take part in preserving and maintaining peace in this region if this is voluntarily requested. This means that the security of the Arab region is intertwined. If the element of interests constitutes the power that binds the regional link with the international link, the first link is governed, apart from interests, by longstanding and historic ties. Therefore, from the Egyptian perspective it is the basic link in building a new security order that could meet the requirements of security and stability in this vital region of the world.

[Muntasir] Let us move to the question of arms control in the Middle East.

[Tantawi] This is one of the most delicate and serious topics, because it mainly concerns one of the state's most influential pillars of national security; namely, military might. In addition, talk of it is related to the issue of war and peace. This is because it is inconceivable to reach a formula for enforcing rules of arms control that is acceptable to the parties of the conflict without agreeing on a clear-cut framework that meets the minimum amount of the just and legitimate demands of each of the parties concerned. [passage omitted]

It is in the national interest of the Middle East countries, particularly in the Arab world, to attain arms control, and Egypt believes in the necessity and importance of this concept. President Husni Mubarak took the lead in launching an initiative for eliminating mass destruction weapons from the Middle East. We insist that this rule applies to all the region's countries without exception, to include all three types of nonconventional weapons (nuclear, chemical, and biological). As far as conventional weapons are concerned, we are taking part in the committee for security and arms control of the multilateral peace talks. We support this concept out of our belief that the region needs a system for regulating the rules of armament and revising the defect in the balance of power, something that caused continued tension and led some parties to resort to the use of force for attaining illegitimate objectives and goals. Logic requires that all parties take part in this process to reach formulas that meet the minimum security requirements of each country. In our view, this cannot be achieved without reaching political solutions for the problems and crises that have exhausted the nation during the past 50 years. We believe that a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the natural gateway for devising the arms control formula that we aspire to. This could lead to security and stability in the region, provided that everyone believes in the genuine feasibility of arms control.

[Muntasir] Despite your reference to the issue of freeing the Middle East from mass destruction weapons, particularly after the United States and Russia, the two nuclear major powers, have clearly shown the inclination to abandon these weapons, this subject needs further elaboration.

[Tantawi] The outcome of the arms limitation negotiations and agreements concluded between the eastern and western blocs during the Cold War era, and completed during the era of detente and under the new world order, has proved to be the best solution for developing relations among countries with a view to facing the challenges of national security. [passage omitted]

Freeing the Middle East from mass destruction weapons can be attained if the elements that ensure its success are available. These elements are as follows:

1. Creating a conviction by the region's parties that comprehensive military superiority by one party over the others and maintaining this superiority permanently is a matter hard to achieve and cannot guarantee national security;
2. Reaching solutions that could end the conflicts and problems among the region's countries, thus leading to a voluntary, not compulsory, improvement of relations among them;
3. Promoting confidence-building measures among the region's countries and developing relations and ties among them through various fields of cooperation;
4. The gradual enforcement of arms control and limitation measures at stages, beginning with the topics that are more likely to succeed than others and building on this success to achieve further success at later stages;
5. Involving other international parties and the UN organizations as neutral parties to guarantee the implementation of the agreements and diminish the parties' concerns or fears that the items to be agreed upon may not be complied with;
6. The need for the agreements to be reached to include all three types of mass destruction weapons—that is, the nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons;
7. Support and backing from the world community and the major powers.

If these elements are crucial for freeing the Middle East of mass destruction weapons, the guarantees for implementing the agreements reached in this respect and commitment by the parties concerned are instrumental for the seriousness, credibility, and continuation of these agreements. This can be attained through inspection and verification measures carried out by working teams and groups from the regional countries that signed these agreements, seeking assistance from international organizations with advanced capabilities in this field, in accordance with the concept of (military openness),

which can be applied the more confidence there is in the parties' commitment to the agreements reached.

[Muntasir] There is an issue that some parties view as sensitive; namely, the question of joint exercises. Do you agree that this is a sensitive issue?

[Tantawi] In general, joint exercises are among the most important elements of military cooperation among the various countries. They constitute the real arena for acquiring and exchanging practical experience in the field of training troops, getting acquainted with the latest weapons, and testing their capabilities in the various conditions they could be used. [passage omitted]

[Muntasir] But why do some people feel sensitive about joint maneuvers with the United States?

[Tantawi] This sensitivity is uncalled for, particularly in the world of today. It is true that the United States is in the forefront of countries with which we are holding joint training, but there are logical reasons for this. It possesses an advanced technology, the most updated and strongest military arsenal in the world, and the material resources to meet the high costs required for this training. [passage omitted]

IRAN

UN Envoy Announces Support for CW Convention Despite Reservations

LD1510104192 Tehran IRNA in English 0920 GMT 15 Oct 92

[Text] New York, Oct. 15, IRNA—Despite its objections to some articles of the convention on prohibition of chemical weapons, Iran supports the U.N. General Assembly resolution calling on governments to confirm and sign it, according to Iran's permanent envoy here Wednesday.

Kamal Kharrazi said that Iran joined the rank of supporters of the resolution because of "our heartfelt wish for annihilation of chemical weapons."

Kharrazi made the remarks when elaborating on Iran's views on international security and disarmament at the first committee of the General Assembly. He said that no country in the world would be as pleased with the prohibition of production, stockpiling and deployment of chemical weapons through implementation of this convention as the Iranian nation which he said was itself a victim of chemical weapons. He expressed hope that the shortcomings of the convention would be overcome when it is prepared for implementation.

The General Assembly is to approve the convention on prohibition of chemical weapons, ratified recently after several years of debates at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, this year and then a commission is to be set up at The Hague to work out the new convention's

implementation. Disarmament experts believe that the commission's procedure would last for a minimum period of two years.

On Iran's criticism of some articles of the convention, Kharrazi said that its definition for major ammunitions and those of secondary importance was not comprehensive adding that its implementation would not be without problems. This will also create problems in inspection field which is a vital part of the convention. He said that according to the convention, Asia, the largest continent in the world with 42 countries, has a ten percent share of the executive council but Europe 22 percent.

The convention also fails to determine how the discriminatory limitations on trade of chemicals should be settled, said Kharrazi calling on the developed countries to remove the present obstacles on the way of transfer of technology and chemicals to other countries for peaceful use.

Turning to nuclear disarmament he said that this contributes a great deal to establishment of regional peace especially in the Middle East.

Iran believes that nuclear weapons do not safeguard the national security of countries and on this basis the Islamic Republic of Iran is committed to its undertakings on non-proliferation of atomic arms, he said. He added that the last year's inspection by experts of the International Atomic Energy Agency of Iranian nuclear installations confirms Iran's commitment.

ISRAEL

Near East Balance Said Upset by Bush, Beijing

93WC0003A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 22 Sep 92 p B1

[Article by Ze'ev Schiff: "Upsetting the Balance of Power"]

[Text] One of the mistaken American decisions in foreign policy was the announcement by President George Bush, in his election campaign, of the sale of 150 F-16's to Taiwan. American experts on Chinese affairs say the Chinese will get back at the Americans because of that deviation.

Israel is among those who are likely to be hurt because of that. Israel is here. As a kind of pedestrian walking on the sidewalk who is hurt in an accident between two cars. The harm will come as a result of chain reactions to the sale of the F-16's to Taiwan, which will hasten sales of weapons and technologies to the Middle East.

A Sharp Change in Policy

Over the years American policy has determined that China's sensitivities must be taken into account and that the balance of power between her and Taiwan should not

be upset. Meanwhile there have certainly been great changes in the international system, but Washington has now taken a step that can only be interpreted as upsetting this delicate balance. That is the real deviation in its policy. In 1982 Washington made a joint announcement with Beijing that when the time would arise to replace Taiwan's military equipment, that would be done on the basis of an incoming system against an outgoing system and that the new systems would be based on the existing simple military technology. The F-16's do not fit that definition.

The previous decision to take China's sensitivities into consideration were not accompanied by an abandonment of Taiwan. Among other things, Washington assisted Taiwan in developing a new fighter plane, secretly put at her disposal a base in the United States and supplied her various technologies. This fighter plane is supposed to have good defensive and interception capabilities. Of course the American weapons industries had an interest in this development, during the course of which the United States is allowing Taiwan to invest in the plane's R&D, where many of the investments are in the United States itself, and at the last moment it is preventing Taiwan from acquiring many of the planes it developed.

The American excuses for the deviation from the policy are strange. They remind you of those that Washington comes up with when she decides to sell advanced weapons systems to the Arabs. The Pentagon now claims that China upset the balance of power in acquiring 24 Sukhoi 27's from Russia. But now Beijing will have a good reason to make further purchases of a lot of new planes from Russia.

The reason for the American deviation is first of all economic. "Jobs now"—that is the slogan of the American weapons industry, and President Bush acted accordingly when he announced during the election campaign, and always in cities that produce the planes, the F-16 deal for Taiwan and the F-15 deal for Saudi Arabia.

China also has the difficult problem, even more painful, of an urgent need for sources of employment. The Chinese can rightfully say they need to behave differently from the Americans when they are offered seductive weapons deals.

Taking into consideration the internal balance of power, whereby the army gets a portion of the profits of the weapons deals, the Chinese behaved with restraint in comparison to the past. Under American pressure, Beijing joined the missile technology supervision agreement (MTCR). From time to time there have been reports of violations of the agreement, but nevertheless it is worthwhile to note her backtracking from the large deal with Syria on the sale of the new, mobile M-9 ballistic missile. American sources say that China even returned a portion of the payments she had received from Damascus (money the Syrians got from Saudi Arabia). Had the

Syrians gotten the M-9, it would have meant a significant increase in their missile strength.

How will China behave now? We will behave as a superpower, was the reaction in the Chinese foreign ministry. It is clear that China will show less consideration for American appeals. The first signal was given when her representative did not appear for a meeting of the five members of the Security Council to discuss weapons control in the Middle East. The conclusion is that now it will be harder to restrain weapons sales to the Middle East and that the multilateral committee on weapons control will find its work harder.

The Atom for Various Goals

It is to be hoped that Beijing will not renew the M-9 missile deal with Damascus, but it is expected that the Chinese will now sell more new military technologies to the Arab countries and to Iran. They excel in the manufacture of various spare parts, and it is reasonable to believe that what the Syrians have difficulty finding today in this area in Russia and other countries, they will find easily in China. By the same token, the Chinese will agree to sell more nuclear technology. They term this "The Atom for Peace," but that is a vague declaration if the purchaser intends to produce nuclear weapons.

For Israel this is bad news. Our foreign and defense policies now have a more complicated task. The road to Beijing does not only go through Washington as it did in the past. Israel will have to act more directly toward Beijing in order to persuade her not to endanger us with her sales. That persuasion will not succeed by means of such declarations as: "We have decided not to sell the Kfir to Taiwan" when China knows that already two weeks ago the Taiwanese representative told Yitzhaq Rabin that his country did not intend to purchase Kfirs.

Arrow Missile Project's Merit Questioned

*TA0110121492 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
1 Oct 92 p B1*

[Article by Re'uven Pedatzur: "A Small Step on a Long Road"]

[Text] The successful test launch of the Arrow missile last week should not mislead anyone. It was but one small step on a very long road full of pitfalls. Naturally, the Arrow Missile Project's Merit Questioned is no cause to underestimate the Israel Aircraft Industry's [IAI] accomplishment, which followed three failed test launches. It should be remembered, however, that the only thing the IAI engineers have tackled up to this point has been the challenge of launching a missile—albeit a very fast one—and that they have not as yet begun addressing the real difficulty: the interception of offensive ballistic missiles.

The Arrow project is now at a crossroads. Soon the defense establishment's decisionmakers will have to make several decisions that will determine its fate. In the

absence of a public debate, pertinent issues have been concealed from the public and may remain the exclusive domain of defense elements. This does not refer to the disclosure of secret information, merely to a businesslike analysis of some of the Arrow project's facets. Such an analysis may reveal various questionable points, which should be discussed in depth before the authorities decide on the investments required to complete the project.

There is a common misconception—and no one in the defense establishment has taken the trouble to correct it—that the U.S. Administration is financing most of the Arrow system's development costs. If that is true, there is no reason to oppose a development plan that will result in an Israeli defense system financed by a foreign government. The truth is different, however. The U.S. Administration is sharing in financing the development of the Arrow missile only, while not allocating a cent to the development of the planned defense system's other components.

The missile is but one component of a complex, elaborate system. Among its other components are two types of radar (early warning radar and fire control radar), national command and control system, communication system, launchers, missile storage installations, and a national early warning system.

Israel alone, without American financing, will have to develop all these. The development cost of the missile itself will stand at 10 to 15 percent of the entire Arrow project's development cost. This means that to complete the development of the Arrow system's other components and to purchase them, the defense establishment will have to allocate about \$8 to \$10 billion over the next decade, in addition to missile development investments (Israel is financing 28 percent of the current stage of the missile's development). The allocation of budgets of such order for one project is liable to bring about a total collapse of the IDF's [Israel Defense Forces] procurement plan. Senior General Staff officers are perfectly well acquainted with the data and fully realize its implications. This is the reason for the broad opposition that the Arrow project encounters in General Staff corridors.

Timetables are another aspect casting doubt on the Arrow's future. Under the original schedule, the Arrow system was supposed to be operational by 1995. Delays caused by previous test failures changed the target date, and the development was rescheduled for completion by 1997. Experts close to the project estimate that this target date as well will not be met and that development will not be completed before the beginning of the next century.

It is believed in Israel that by that time, however, Arab countries will have acquired nuclear weapons. Former Defense Minister Moshe Arens estimated that additional countries in the region will be equipped with nuclear weapons within a decade. Both the Intelligence Branch chief and the chief of staff endorsed the minister's view.

Prime Minister and Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin has also voiced his concern over the Arab countries' procurement of nuclear weapons. If this estimate materializes and Middle East countries acquire ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, the Arrow may become irrelevant even before its development has been completed. Israel's situation is such that a missile or two, landing on its territory, would exact an unbearable price, which Israel must not countenance.

To avert such a strike, Israel would need a completely hermetic active defense screen. That is, it needs to be assured that 100 percent of the offensive missiles will be destroyed. None of the people involved in the project is prepared to pledge such a result. The Air Force, which defined the Arrow's operational specifications, indicated much lower destruction rates.

While such defense standards can be sufficient vis-a-vis Scud missiles with conventional warheads, they are hardly relevant in the face of the threat of nuclear missiles. The defense establishment's policymakers must decide whether the benefits Israel will derive from the Arrow system in 10 or 20 years, when the Middle East will be nuclear, justify the cost of completing its development and acquiring it. In a nuclear Middle East, Israel will have to resort to a different policy, one that is not based necessarily on active defense, but mainly on deterrence.

No one can anticipate the technological snags that may arise in the future stages of the Arrow development. The project is based on technological breakthroughs that have not been implemented anywhere else so far. IAI engineers may come up with solutions to all of them, but on the other hand, they are liable to encounter a dead end. The Arrow's basic concepts are very interesting and promising, but foreign developments of advanced projects show that not all of them reached the finish line because they did not manage to clear technological hurdles for which, according to the original plans, applicable solutions had been anticipated. This does not mean that the Arrow will meet a similar fate, but again, the policymakers must consider whether they can base such a considerable part of their defense policy against ballistic missiles on a project whose future hides behind such a thick technological fog.

The Arrow development involves many other issues. While some of them cannot be discussed because of the imperative secrecy limitations, one should be mentioned: the fire control radar, whose development plan was given to Elta. Some \$100 million of the defense budget were allocated for the initial stages of the development of this radar. Air Force experts have many doubts as to Elta's capability to tackle the development of such an advanced radar. In their opinion, Elta will be unable to complete the development in the coming years, and the process will continue for over a decade.

Basically, this is a complicated professional argument, but if the Air Force people are right, a situation may arise

in which a vital component of a defense system will be incapable of performing the task for which it had been created.

There is room for pride over the Arrow's successful test launch, but this does not contradict the need to examine the plan. A decision to continue the project requires vast Israeli (and not American) investments. Its impact on the defense establishment and the entire national economy must be examined, and the defense minister should initiate a serious debate on its future.

'Astonishment' at SDI Plan To Defend Israeli Territory

TA0510144392 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
5 Oct 92 pp A1, A8

[Report by defense affairs correspondent Aluf Ben]

[Excerpts] Next year, as part of SDI, the U.S. Government would like to allocate \$43 million for the technological examination of the Raptor, an armed unmanned aerial vehicle [UAV] which would fly at a high altitude and intercept surface-to-surface missiles, such as the Scuds, at takeoff.

Operational scenarios drafted by SDI and published in JANE'S DEFENSE WEEKLY, estimate that four Raptors would be able to defend Israel's population centers against missiles such as the Scuds. Thirteen such UAV's would defend Israel and the Persian Gulf states against long-range missiles fired from anywhere in Iraq. [passage omitted]

Israeli defense officials expressed their astonishment yesterday at the reported plan to have four UAV's defend Israeli territory. "We were not consulted on the matter," they said. [passage omitted]

Israeli security experts argue that such a UAV could not replace a ground defense system such as the Arrow because only a relative small number of UAV's could be put in the air, and they would be no protection against hundreds of surface-to-surface missiles in the Arab countries. Moreover, the experts say, the Arrow and the UAV could complement each other, as different components of an antimissile defense system.

The experts added that possession of the Raptor would improve Israel's deterrent power. Furthermore, intercepting the Scuds at takeoff would deter the enemy from using biological or nuclear warheads because their countries could be seriously harmed if the missiles blew up over them. It would partially deter them from using chemical warheads because the impact of an explosion in mid air in the deserts of the Middle East, such as those in western Iraq, would be minimal.

Germany To Finance Third Patriot Battery

TA0610094792 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
in Hebrew 6 Oct 92 p 8

[Report by military correspondent Dani Sade]

[Text] Israel will receive another battery of Patriot missiles in five months. With its arrival here, the Air Force will have three batteries of surface-to-air missiles of this type.

The new Patriot battery will be given to Israel by Germany in the framework of compensation for damage caused by the Gulf war, which includes six Fuchs vehicles for the detection of chemical weapons substances.

At first, Germany wanted to give Israel a Patriot battery from its own arsenal, but when it became apparent that this would be a PAC-1 type battery—the first generation, which cannot intercept surface-to-surface missiles—the Germans agreed to finance a new Patriot battery.

SYRIA**Foreign Minister Links CW, Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaties**

JN0210194992 Damascus Syrian Arab Television
Network in Arabic 1830 GMT 2 Oct 92

[Text] Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar' made the following statement to a Syrian Arab Television correspondent: Arab foreign ministers held a meeting during which

they discussed the peace talks and process. They also discussed the treaty banning chemical weapons and agreed to link the Arab states' endorsement of the treaty to Israel's endorsement of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

The Arab foreign ministers also stated that the boycott on Israel should not be lifted until Israel implements the resolutions of international legitimacy regarding the peace process and withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories.

Foreign Minister al-Shar' also held a meeting with the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates [UAE], in which they discussed the dispute over Abu Musa Island between the UAE and Iran. They asserted that the dispute should be resolved by political means and good-neighborly relations.

Foreign Minister al-Shar' returned to Damascus this morning from Rabat at the end of a brief visit on his way back from New York after participating in the 47th session of the UN General Assembly. Al-Shar' met with King Hassan II of Morocco last night.

Foreign Minister al-Shar' was seen off at Rabat's international airport by Dr. Abdellatif Filali, Moroccan minister of state for foreign affairs and cooperation, senior Moroccan Foreign Ministry officials, as well as the Syrian charge d'affaires and embassy staff in Rabat.

GENERAL

Nuclear Weapons Designer Interviewed

934P0001A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian
12 Sep 92 p 10

[Interview with nuclear weapons chief designer Stanislav Nikolayevich Voronin by Vladimir Gubarev at Arzamas-16; date not given: "Twenty Thousand Megatonnes. For What? Concerning Not Only the Fate of the Bombs and Weapons But Also the Future of Russia"]

[Text] The "dove of peace," which had become so popular in the recent past, has now disappeared. A holy place does not long remain empty, and here on the pages of the newspapers and in everyday usage, new "feathered friends" have appeared—"Chernobyl nightingales," "tomtits of glasnost," "eagles of perestroyka," "blind hawks," "business blue tits," and "swans of pornography." If you like the list can go on endlessly if you set yourself the goal of compiling a "Dictionary of Perestroyka." But the purpose of our meeting with Stanislav Nikolayevich Voronin was something different, and so I have named only a few of the names that have been adopted today in society. And I did not do it haphazardly because quite recently both Voronin and I were numbered in the same flock—"blind hawks."

The controversies about nuclear weapons, which almost immediately grew into demands for their developers to halt their work, are today as much in vogue as the discussions about nuclear power stations. Typically, the problems of the Chernobyl power station are discussed by those who did not appear there or in the vicinity of Kiev during the cleanup after the accident, while atomic and hydrogen bombs are discussed by politicians and environmentalists whose knowledge of physics is limited to their lessons at secondary school. This is not a reproach but a call to the people who now sometimes occupy a very high position in the government and have a closer acquaintance with the essence of the matter, so that they do not lapse into absurd positions that evoke only smiles among the professionals.

Examples? Of course.

USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev announces that we have methods for detecting nuclear weapons from space, including aboard U.S. warships. The scientists, ours and the Americans', are in shock—at the present stage of technology this is impossible! But a "global experiment" is organized on the Black Sea and dozens of journalists gather there... and there is total silence. An effective political statement is nothing but a bluff.

There is a similar story for President of Russia Boris Yeltsin when he announced that our missiles have been "retargeted" away from American cities.

President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk is not backward in this. His "sensational" statement that in Ukraine they will themselves dismantle tactical nuclear weapons and

then store them (!) in the Chernobyl zone was, to say the least, calculated only for those people who have no understanding of nuclear weapons.

If presidents allow themselves to do this, why do their political advisers not speak out. We have one effective "revelation" after another, for example, that in the former USSR they secretly (!) conducted nuclear explosions in oil and gas deposits and created underground storage facilities and even lakes. And then the "investigations" start, and the search for witnesses, in short, passions are inflamed. And all one has to do is take up the newspapers files of, for example, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA or PRAVDA, and one can read about these experiments in the greatest of detail. I say nothing about books; there have been several, and not just for specialists but for the mass audience, where the "Plowshare" program conducted in the United States, and our program to use nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes have been described. Well fine, I agree: Young people might not know what happened almost 20 years ago, how the terrible gushers of burning oil and gas were extinguished in Urta-Bulak and Pamuk, or a storage facility was made in Orenburg for gas condensate, but state counselors should know this by dint of their duties. In an extreme case it is possible to refer to the experts, who can provide detailed information. Or even to journalists who were present not only at the launches of cosmonauts but also at nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Your obedient servant was among them, and thus I have a right to say this.

At one meeting with French and Japanese journalists Stanislav Voronin and I and several designers talked in detail about the harm that comes from ignorance, and from those numerous newspaper canards that turn up in our press. We talked candidly about what we think. And the reaction was not long in coming: A letter appeared from a group of scientists and journalists who condemned us and called us "blind hawks" that just wanted to blow up the planet. Naturally, it was precisely those people who were concerned about it and about our welfare, not other "Voronins" and "Gubarevs." Political authority, as is known, is not squeamish about using any methods, if only people talk about them. Perhaps in "pure" politics this is justified, but when it is a question of nuclear weapons it is essential to be extremely careful and—the main thing—to understand what we are talking about.

The experience of Chernobyl teaches this. Its lessons. And one of them is to act not more than a year after a tragedy but before it happens, so as to prevent it, or at least, if it has already occurred, not to allow it to grow. However, it is always safer to talk about things in comfortable and prestigious offices than to work at the epicenter of a tragedy or dismantle nuclear weapons with one's own hands.

Populism in our field is very dangerous. This is how Voronin opened our conversation. It can lead to catastrophe because people are disoriented. It is always essential to remember that we are dealing with dangerous technologies, and fortunately no major mistakes have yet been made; we have had no accidents with weapons. So why deliberately provoke them by disparaging and insulting people who work in this complex?

Stanislav Nikolayevich returned from Moscow to Arzamas-16 in the morning. The day before he had met with Russian deputies and informed them about the state of affairs with respect to nuclear disarmament.

"It is essential to carry out explanatory work," he had advised. "Although to be honest, a chief designer does have other tasks... But what can be done, this is the time..."

The environmental situation in the Far North was debated in the Supreme Soviet. Naturally emotions ran high about the nuclear tests on Novaya Zemlya—once again all the ills of the North can now be attributed to the nuclear people. In contrast to the environmentalists, they had prepared for that meeting: They presented a report from three independence commissions, none of which, incidentally, had any connection with Arzamas-16. Yes, the scientists did confirm that there are several spots on Novaya Zemlya (with a radius of about 150 meters) where the background radiation is elevated. In other places—and that is virtually all the territory of the islands—the background radiation is lower than in Moscow.

I have the impression, Voronin admits, that no one had familiarized themselves with the conclusions of the commission or the reports from the institute that has been dealing with this problem for several decades. Incidentally, the Norwegians, Finns, and Swedes have carefully studied the documents and they agree with them, while here there is indifference... The impression is that there is a desire to ascribe everything to us, even though the problems of the North and the effect of a certain technological stress is unusually acute. They must be solved immediately, but this is difficult work... So here we have a solution: Blame the nuclear people. But this will not alter the situation, and the ecology of the North is crossing the threshold of catastrophe. If only it has not happened... No, we need to tilt not at windmills but at the real danger!

[Gubarev] Stanislav Nikolayevich, you are a chief designer of atomic and hydrogen weapons. As far as I am aware, only four people in the country hold this title, or, more accurately, occupy such a post. So, let us familiarize ourselves a little better with this: How old are you and how long did you work at Arzamas-16?

[Voronin] I am 61. I have been working with weapons since 1954.

[Gubarev] Are you a Hero [of Socialist Labor]?

[Voronin] No.

[Gubarev] A Lenin or State Prize laureate?

[Voronin] Yes.

[Gubarev] What are your scientific credentials?

[Voronin] Candidate of sciences.

[Gubarev] That is all?

[Voronin] I never defended a thesis... My colleagues reproach me but in fact I never did, and indeed I begrudged the time spent on writing a dissertation and defending it, and so forth. And to be honest, I absolutely did not need it.

[Gubarev] Let us start our conversation with two factors—**weapons safety and the environment.** Have you always thought about this?

[Voronin] At the very outset of the work, of course, I did not think about the environment. And primarily because I am not an expert in that field. Weapons safety is another matter. For me it was always a priority. It is simply that the level of insuring this safety has changed markedly during this time. The requirements, of course, have changed, and they have left their mark on weapons design.

[Gubarev] For example?

[Voronin] In general I can say this... The first items we had were "nuclear-dangerous," that is, in accidents and explosions with conventional explosives, which are in the weapon, there could have been an incomplete nuclear explosion. So special steps were taken; in particular, fissionable materials and explosives were stored separately. They were brought together only before a weapon was to be used. And the detonators were placed at the very last moment.

[Gubarev] And this is why it was very dangerous work?

[Voronin] Of course. Operations were carried out under special control and they were done by top-class experts. Naturally, everyone withdrew to a distance when these operations were being carried out.

[Gubarev] I remember the "silver tent" that only the "hardware men" could enter, and how they ceremonially, almost haughtily, would go there in their snow-white gloves... There was a certain air of mystery, and only the ordained priests were allowed access to it. It sounds somewhat sublime, but that is how it seemed to us, the non-ordained.

[Voronin] And that is how it was. Incidentally, much of it has still been preserved, it is tradition... To make up for this the degree of danger grew, in particular when we had to make new detonators that would not explode in a fire or when struck, and would not work even if they

were crushed. In general it was possible to make detonators less sensitive to heat and mechanical effects than those used in charges of conventional explosives.

[Gubarev] Was this in and of itself a major scientific discovery?

[Voronin] It was a gigantic step forward. A great scientific and technical achievement... Later there was a new requirement: We had to make weapons that would not result in a nuclear detonation in accidents, even partial, and even if an operator error occurred. That is, the scheme and design had to be such that in any catastrophe or emergency there would not be a nuclear explosion. And that requirement was piously met several decades ago.

[Gubarev] So this was impossible during the initial stage?

[Voronin] Of course. The fault lay in the progress in our field and the understanding of the processes taking place during a nuclear explosion. It appeared as the result of tests and experiment and search. And so today no design can be put into production unless it possesses this safety feature... With the inclusion of tritium in the weapon, which, as is known, is highly toxic and radioactive, we immediately turned to the problem of preventing it from doing any harm whatever the circumstances.

[Gubarev] What is especially dangerous about tritium?

[Voronin] It is active. It easily enters the human body through the respiratory organs and the skin. Tritium dissolves in water and again easily enters the body. Although it has a relatively short half-life it is very dangerous. And we succeeded in taming it... Whereas in the early years with assemblies containing tritium we worked under dosimetric monitoring and people were protected by insulating tools and special facilities, now we guarantee total practical safety in work under normal conditions.

[Gubarev] That is, without full suits?

[Voronin] Normal conditions, as with any other equipment.

[Gubarev] Is this another example of achievement?

[Voronin] I would like to emphasize that our field develops quickly, and tasks must be resolved that would appear impossible to resolve. And each one of them is a major achievement for science and technology, this is very important. In science and modern technology stagnation is dangerous, and, moreover, fatal.

[Gubarev] It is dangerous for you? I mean today?

[Voronin] We have now entered a new stage. The weapons that remain after the deep cuts require a new approach. The fact that we stockpiled so many weapons was madness! There are about 50,000 warheads in the world—15,000 to 20,000 megatonnes. I repeat, this is madness. In my opinion, both for military purposes and

for deterrence so many were not needed, and now even the most militarized circles understand this, regardless of whether they are on this side of the ocean or the other. And it is sensible that reduction talks are under way, only they should be conducted in a such a way that a nuclear balance is maintained at each stage of the reductions. If this balance is upset it will again lead to the destabilization of peace, and it is very important to maintain this balance because then, under threat of a retaliatory strike, no one will take it into his head to use nuclear weapons.

[Gubarev] And is this really possible?

[Voronin] During the first stage they thought that nuclear weapons were not intended for battlefield use. But it is now clear that it is a political weapon, a weapon of deterrence. Reasonable people will never use them, but they do force any aggressor to refrain from adventurist decisions. Anyone who will or has devised something bad is perfectly well aware what he may sustain a terrible retaliatory strike.

[Gubarev] You mentioned figures—"50,000 warheads and 20,000 megatonnes." If they were all exploded together what would happen to the planet?

[Voronin] Every living thing would be destroyed many times over.

[Gubarev] You have understood perfectly that so many weapons are not necessary. Why did no one protest?

[Voronin] In my early years I did talk often with Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov. I was a designer and worked at a Kuhlman drafting unit, but the theoreticians, led by Sakharov and Zeldovich, often came to us. And involuntarily, when discussing design, we would touch on matters on the philosophical plane, for example, whether what we were doing was useful, what the consequences might be, and so forth. Andrey Dmitriyevich (and what a unique man he was!) would even calculate impromptu that if a bomb with such-and-such a yield were detonated, which generation might have gene mutations and who would suffer from what. And so as the result of such conversations, right from the start we were concerned about the consequences of the work that we were doing. When in time we had to deal with the problem of the effectiveness of nuclear weapons and the strategic balance, we paid attention to the more sober approach of the Americans; they worked systematically and did not waste resources senselessly. They had longer-term programs, more clearly defined goals, and they made cardinal changes in weapons every 10 or 15 years. Given our system of totalitarian, central leadership, they were constantly demanding changes, and essentially we developed new models every three or four years. Hence we had an enormous inventory of items. And excessive numbers. And this was waste and expense. We were aware of the real state of affairs and we expressed our negative opinion, but this kind of information was not carried up to the top levels. We have reports with detailed analysis of the state of affairs in the United

States, and, incidentally, we still look very much at a disadvantage compared to the Americans. It could be seen that the work was not organized sensibly, but the people receiving this material from us and who had entree to the top echelons of power were, in my opinion, simply afraid to report it. For that might have caused an ambiguous reaction, first and foremost toward themselves.

[Gubarev] Have you ceased this kind of work?

[Voronin] Why? No. We are still engaged in it constantly.

[Gubarev] It is important that you speak out in public otherwise it will all be repeated.

[Voronin] Collegiality in decisions is essential. Earlier it used to be that the someone at the top would say all we had to do was comply, not judge but do, and that applied to everything!... And there was one other special feature: We copied the Americans a great deal, but we were in a different geopolitical position, and there were other tasks that built up with these terrible weapons, and it seemed that we had to have unique inventories and types of nuclear weapons, but in fact we often copied, and so we made unnecessary items.

[Gubarev] Do you think that Sakharov expressed your general viewpoint when he came out from behind the barbed wire?

[Voronin] It seems to me that Sakharov could have been more use here. For our business, of course. It certainly would have been easier for us... But he left. Andrey Dmitriyevich had many friends and supporters here, and perhaps together with him we would have been able to do much more. But there, out in the "big world," he remained alone... At first things were difficult without him. He was a calm man, but decisive. He maintained his views firmly and in most cases (this is my personal opinion) he was right.

[Gubarev] We have good memories of Andrey Dmitriyevich, and he had good relations with those who worked at Arzamas-16.

[Voronin] In his book he offers kind memories of many people. David Abramovich Fishman sat in this office, he was one of the founders of our design school, and a teacher for many of us designers. Sakharov wrote accurately about him. It was pleasant... It was interesting to work in those times.

[Gubarev] Why?

[Voronin] We were not burdened exclusively with living concerns. There were opportunities to give oneself up to the work, we even used to spend the night here. And we did not complain, it was difficult but interesting. At that time anything new was a breakthrough. Now we are essentially working to put the finishing touches on what was invented then... Well, for example, what is safety? We started working on it immediately, but now we are

doing something different—bringing it to the necessary standard. So the blunt truth is that people say "everything has been done," but on the other hand this is not because it is just necessary to improve safety but because not all the possibilities of nuclear weapons have been discovered.

[Gubarev] What complexities are involved in the problem of destroying nuclear weapons, and storing and dismantling them? Or is it a simple matter?

[Voronin] No, there are enough complexities. They are that whereas previously in order to renew the arsenals we made so-and-so many munitions and dismantled so many, that is, there were normal work methods, the process now is different. In terms of utilization there are enormous volumes of weapons, and several problems have arisen immediately. First, ensuring safety in transportation. Shipments of very dangerous freight have now increased sharply. And it is not a question of quality, but other factors: the state of the railroads themselves and of the rolling stock, the higher level of criminal activity, and unpredictable events, even that trains themselves may be fired on. Previously it was based on strict discipline and good organization. If a train was moving, nothing moved in the other direction, and nothing overtook it; it moved with cover on all sides. And an appropriate guard was set at all places where a train would be moving. And in general this was very rare. But now there might be several dozen kinds of transportation on the move.

[Gubarev] But surely provision is made for all contingencies?

[Voronin] Do not forget that a usual event in an unusual situation is dangerous in and of itself. And the situation now is not normal... Second, in and of itself the process of dismantling differs from the process of assembly and the danger is somewhat greater. Because of the age of the materials, while even the design is "compressed," and so forth. But in production we make provision for all measures, we are familiar with the technology, and we know how to act in any given situation... And of course, there are storage problems that we are working on. We have made provision for all technical measures to safeguard the technology but sometimes they are not successful because of political considerations. For this reason there should not be haste in our business... And of course, there is the final thing—storage of fissionable materials and monitoring them. There is one discrepancy here. For some reason they talk only about us monitoring them, but how do we store fissionable materials? In my opinion this is a common problem. If the Americans want to know how we are storing plutonium and uranium, then we should also be monitoring how they store them. There should be strict parity here. If we have things under wraps here, so do they. But today there is essentially no monitoring mechanism, and as far as I know no sensible talks about this are under way. There are demands from their side, but everything is still one-sided, and we cannot agree to such a situation and

we must bring order on a parity basis. The control mechanism should be international, and the same for everyone.

[Gubarev] Do you people, as developers, have psychological problems with the dismantling?

[Voronin] I would say this: Weapons people always have special psychological features. We are dealing with a dangerous production, and this must affect a person. Like a combat engineer, there is no room for error. From the standpoint of dismantling and utilization, I think that no problems will arise here. For we are constantly talking about the excessive numbers of weapons and about cutbacks. So most of our specialists support sensible arms cutbacks, but they are so often depicted as "hawks," that is all.

[Gubarev] So the weapons are being dismantled. What can be used today or in the future? Or are we destroying them until nothing is left?

[Voronin] Costs are still greater than profits. There are few materials of which we have shortages. They are being utilized for second use, but our designs are not metal intensive and the proportion of metal in the structural elements is not great. There will be excess amounts of uranium-235 that can be used in the development of nuclear power engineering. Plutonium will also be available but its use is still a major question. It is obvious that it must be stored until better times, when scientists have devised a way to make use of it. Incidentally, even Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov in his time used to say that there will be prospects for using plutonium, but there is no possibility at present.

[Gubarev] If the Federal Nuclear Center is given the general task of deciding how to make use of weapons-grade plutonium, will you find a solution?

[Voronin] Undoubtedly, given appropriate funding and resources. Moreover, sooner or later this task will have to be solved. There are already certain ideas and proposals, but it is still a task for the future.

[Gubarev] There is a game that is very popular among journalists. This question is asked: "If I were the director..." Essentially you are this "director" and so I would like to pose something else: Imagine that you have become the president of Russia, what would you do with nuclear weapons in general in your field? Get up for a moment from your seat as chief designer and go across to the Kremlin...

[Voronin] I would do what we are proposing. First, arms reductions, and not simply cutbacks; they should be accompanied by a very careful balance and preservation of parity. Hence the moral: The composition and structure of nuclear weapons for the country at each stage of disarmament should be very precisely analyzed giving due consideration to the situation both with the Americans and in the world in general. In my opinion, consideration of these matters is impossible without nuclear

specialists, and, moreover, is a mistake. Unfortunately, we are little involved and we have only a poor understanding of the level and of what recommendations are used, and what predictions for the future are used to make decisions. Some weapons are being left, others are being withdrawn, and I am convinced that in this process what we say should not be last in line. Perhaps it should be the first word, not the last. Our opinion should be heard because we are aware of the special features of our own designs and we really do know what should be in service and what should be withdrawn first. There is no hiding the fact that there are munitions that we, the designers, would not want to have in service. But if they are retained for reasons that do not depend on us that will be a bad thing. Unfortunately, we have already encountered cases of this kind. There are munitions that we have been trying to have withdrawn for 15 years or more, but our opinion notwithstanding they are not only being retained but also reproduced. Perhaps now the situation is changing... Second, there are the initiatives by the initiators, but now is the time when it is necessary to compare proposals on reducing nuclear weapons with the status of nonnuclear defensive and offensive forces. The balance of power is determined not just by nuclear parity; there are systems that upset this. And this is a step toward destabilization in the world. These factors should be taken into account, but it seems to me that our Ministry of Foreign Affairs often pursues political initiatives and tries to gain authority and weight in the eyes of the public while forgetting about the purely military-technical considerations. Diplomats should consult with the specialists more often. For events may unfold in an unpredictable way, and as a result we may find ourselves under strong pressure. All kinds of centers for strategic studies have been set up in Russia, made up of former military people, and even just amateurs, and the government often listens to their opinions. And very often the results of their studies are presented as objective, even though all they are doing is fulfilling an order and reflecting the sentiments of particular groups in society. I do not dispute that the opinion of such centers should be taken into account, but they should not be used as a basis for execution without analyzing the others. Perhaps this kind of center for strategic studies should be set up also at Arzamas-16, for we are talking about very complex and very important problems, and they should not be given over to the complete control of nonprofessionals.

[Gubarev] You have been here for 38 years. Are you sorry for all those years?

[Voronin] You know, I am not!... Where would I have found more interesting and fascinating work? Nowhere, perhaps. It is for us unusual, unconventional. And indeed, where would I have been able to meet such a number of eminent people? And the most important thing is this: that I have been able to travel around the country and be in the most diverse kinds of collectives, and so I can say candidly that I have never encountered the kind of collective that we have had and have... And

perhaps the mentality of its character is that if I start something I see it through to the end. And the collective really is unique. Its composition is more or less permanent, and it has splendid traditions; we ourselves fostered them and are constantly nurturing them. So there is satisfaction from work and life here. We absorbed the best there was in the country, and hence the high reliability and quality, and the attitude toward work. I believe that we have the best system for developing designs in the country. So that it would be unfair to want anything else...

[Gubarev] When was the most difficult time?

[Voronin] That is now. And not because I have become a chief designer; time was when we simply had to be concerned about our own business. We must neutralize interference by nonprofessionals in nuclear problems, and it is impossible to ignore such statements, because it is always more difficult to correct mistakes. So we have to engage in "explanatory" work. Not only with the deputies, but also with journalists.

[Gubarev] I understand the allusion, so all that remains for me to do is thank you for the interview.

Plutonium-Producing Krasnoyarsk Reactor Shut Down

Country's Last Single-Flow Weapons Reactor

*LD0110135092 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0518 GMT 29 Sep 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yuriy Khots]

[Text] Krasnoyarsk, 29 Sep—Yet another page in the history of our country's military-industrial complex has been turned. The last single-flow [pyramotochnyy] reactor producing weapons-grade plutonium—for nuclear warheads—was shut down today at the Krasnoyarsk chemical ore-processing plant in the presence of Russian and foreign journalists.

Two such reactors were in operation at the plant for over 30 years. Deep underground, they faithfully manufactured enough of their deadly substance for several all-out nuclear wars. They also did considerable damage to the Yenisey, pouring into it radioactive water that had been used for cooling. The first reactor was shut down at the start of this summer, so further pollution of the Yenisey has been averted. The reactors, even though shut down, will remain under expert supervision for a long time to come. Only in 50 years' time will they be finally interred in shafts.

The question already arises of what further use to make of the reactor staff's scientific expertise. One option under consideration is to manufacture some demonstration models of small reactors that could be used in outlying northern regions to generate heat and electricity.

Environmentalists Object to Plans for Waste Dump

*LD0910162292 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1200 6 Oct 92*

[Video report including recorded passage by correspondent S. Sysoyev and an unidentified speaker; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] People are worried in Krasnoyarsk by the plans announced by the Ministry of Atomic Energy to build a nuclear waste dump alongside the city, which has a population of 1 million. Our correspondent has the details:

[Sysoyev] Celebrations marking the shutdown of the second nuclear reactor, which formerly produced weapons-grade plutonium in Krasnoyarsk, are over. However, it turns out that their joy was premature. Environmentalists began circulating persistent rumors that following the move to shut the reactor a major repository for nuclear waste products is being built outside the city. It turns out, however, there is no smoke without fire. There has even been a special scientific and practical conference in Krasnoyarsk regarding this issue.

[Unidentified speaker] The reason for the gathering is that the actual decision to build (?RT-2) [presumably the dump site designation] has already been made and that there are no problems at all—apart from the environment.

[Sysoyev] At a meeting with specialists from the Krasnoyarsk survival foundation, representatives of the chemical ore-dressing plant essentially accepted that the new nuclear burial site will be harmless. Unfortunately, it is difficult to believe that.

Deputy Minister at Tokyo Symposium on Defense Nuclear Conversion

*LD0510200992 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1537 GMT 5 Oct 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Varlamov]

[Text] Tokyo October 5 TASS—Nikolay Yegorov, Russian deputy minister for nuclear energy, told ITAR-TASS that Russia is prepared to cooperate with state and private structures of other countries on all the ranges of the conversion of the Russian nuclear complex. Yegorov heads the Russian delegation to the first Russo-Japanese-U.S. symposium that opened in Tokyo on Monday [5 October]. The symposium on the "Control Over Nuclear Arms and Nuclear Research After the Ending of the Cold War—Prospects for Peaceful Uses" was organized by the Japanese newspaper YOMIURI with the assistance of the Japanese Foreign Ministry and Japan's Science and Technology Agency and also with the assistance of the Russian non-governmental organization Council for Foreign Policy and Defence.

Participants in the symposium pointed to the danger of nuclear terrorism that enhances proportionately to the widening of raw material market for nuclear power. The U.S. side believes that each country having nuclear power stations should clearly determine its needs in fuel and should not permit free travel of uranium and plutonium meant for peaceful uses across its borders. Moreover, while Russia and the U.S. undergo disarmament, it should not be forgotten that nuclear weapons are possessed by Britain, France, China, that nuclear preparations are being made by India, Iraq, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea. The role of international inspections of nuclear facilities enhances in this connection.

Japanese participants in the symposium stressed in their speeches that Japan, in principle, is prepared to help develop technologies for the processing of weapon-grade plutonium. There is even a theoretical possibility of a variant under which Japan would purchase Russian plutonium via the U.S. and would process it at its own reactor, Ichihisa Mori, acting director of the Japanese Nuclear Industrial Forum, said, specifically.

In the interview with ITAR-TASS, Yegorov refuted a report published by YOMIURI on Monday that Russia had suggested to Japan a project of using as fuel for Japanese reactors Russian plutonium resulting from the dismantling of nuclear weapons. "It was not a project but merely an unofficial proposal, one of possibilities of cooperation", Yegorov said.

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

START Ratification Would Enhance Process

PM0110100192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 1 Oct 92 p 3

[Article by Manki Ponomarev: "Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty Is More Than One Year Old. It Is High Time It Came Into Force"]

[Text] The Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms was concluded in Moscow as long as 14 months ago—31 July 1991. But it has not yet come into force because the parties to it just cannot complete the process of its ratification.

There are various reasons for this. The most important one is probably that the Soviet Union, in whose name this treaty was signed together with the United States, broke up during this time. It took several months to resolve the problem of legal succession. The i's were dotted in Lisbon in May of this year, when the United States, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus signed a special protocol, according to which the former Soviet republics that have strategic nuclear weapons on their territory will become full parties to the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms.

Since then, however, only Kazakhstan has officially ratified this treaty. Russia is expected to discuss it in the

Supreme Soviet in the near future, perhaps even this month. Ukraine and Belarus are also in line.

But how do things stand in the United States? Various opinions have been voiced there concerning the Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty, under which the United States and the former Soviet nuclear arsenals are to be reduced by approximately one-third over the next seven years. But, on the whole, it has elicited a positive assessment, and the concluding stage of its ratification has now begun in the U.S. Senate.

The Senate hearings on this question are proceeding rather stormily. But Senator Malcolm Wallop's attempt to drag out the treaty's discussion was resolutely rejected, and a decision to limit the time for debate was adopted by 87 votes to six.

At the session a letter was read out from Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, who urged senators to ratify the treaty as quickly as possible. The letter emphasizes that "the Senate's decision to codify the ending of the era of confrontation along with the new steps that we are taking to strengthen stability will enable our children and grandchildren to grow up free from fear of a nuclear Armageddon." Many senators responded to this appeal. Claiborne Pell, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, pointed out that the Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty is of tremendous significance, as it binds four former Soviet republics to an obligation; will open up the way to conclude with Russia an agreement on the further elimination of nuclear arms; will make a major contribution to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world; and will prompt other nuclear powers to reduce their arsenals. He was supported by George Mitchell, leader of the Democratic majority, and by other senators.

To all appearances, the Senate will approve a recommendation to the President to ratify the treaty. This will be of great practical significance. First, an opportunity is being opened up to embark on the practical realization of the treaty's provisions—the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. Second, on the agenda will be the question of reaching an agreement between the United States and Russia on ways to implement the framework accord reached this summer during the Russian Federation president's visit to Washington, according to which a still larger reduction—by approximately two-thirds, compared with the present level—in the two countries' strategic offensive arms is proposed.

Russian Spokesman Hails U.S. START Ratification

LD0210231492 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 2200 GMT 2 Oct 92

[Text] A Foreign Ministry spokesman in Moscow has welcomed the news about the ratification of the Strategic Arms Treaty by the United States Congress. Mr. Sergey Yastrzhembskiy said his country would also try to speed up the ratification process by its parliament.

The spokesman also said that the two countries were engaged in intensive talks in a bid to hammer out an agreement on further cutbacks in nuclear weapons.

Experiment in Explosive Elimination of ICBM Silos

934P0002A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by Aleksandr Dolinin: "The Villagers Did Not Hear the Explosion: Although It Resounded in a Ballistic Missile Silo"]

[Text] The Strategic Arms Reduction and Limitation Treaty has not yet been ratified in the Russian parliament, but preparations for its practical implementation have already begun in the Strategic Missile Forces.

For the past 30 and more years the inhabitants of the villages next to which hundreds of ICBM's [intercontinental ballistic missiles]—buried at a depth of many meters and ready for launching—were located did not experience anything dreadful. Many of them did not even suspect the proximity of nuclear weapons. But nowadays, when the "cold war" is behind us, when the presidents of the two great powers are striving to free our Mother Earth from the warhead-equipped missiles concealed in her depths, many such secrets are being revealed.

And it is also clear that the whole world (except, perhaps, many of our fellow-citizens) has come to know the places with their nuclear-missile secrets—places from which (and it is high time for this) we will have to remove these lethal and—thank God—unrequired weapons. Among the uninitiated, this situation could—at first glance—cause some alarm. Moreover, this will require quite a large sum of the people's money, and pockets in Russia these days are virtually empty. An acceptable way has been found by the Strategic Missile Forces, which have been assigned the primary responsibility for ridding us of the heavy nuclear burdens—an assignment which was ordered from the highest level.

Many specialists have been thinking about how best to reduce the nuclear-missile danger. Because, of course, from our side alone, in accordance with the SNV [Strategic Offensive Weapons] Treaty and with Washington's consent, hundreds of silo-type launchers have been forbidden to go on "living" for a long time. How should we proceed with them?

There were several variants. It was proposed, for example, that we employ the method of deep-level dismantling of the missile system: taking apart everything that was hidden in the earth, but in reverse order. But they tried it, and it is unfeasible. It would take an entire month to finish one silo. And this would not measure up to the treaty obligations at all. Moreover, at a depth of 30 and more meters the silo becomes flooded with ground water. And the expenditures for such operations are

enormous. Therefore, although this plan was superficially attractive, it was abandoned. They arrived at a second variant. What is it like?

In the United States at one time the detonation method was considered to be the safest one from an ecological and economical point of view; this pertained to eliminating the silo-type launchers for the Minuteman-II. Our own missile-launch engineers, perhaps, have somewhat more experience with this method. Furthermore, they proposed not simply blasting, but blasting which would be—in a certain sense—creative.

As the specialists assert, there has been no experience to draw upon—either domestic or in world practice—with regard to such "creative detonations." And there were more than enough doubters to go around. But this method's advocates began calculating and testing. Under the leadership of Colonel General A. Volkov, commander-in-chief of the RVSN [Strategic Missile Forces], specialists headed up by Major General V. Lysov, chief of the RVSN's Engineering Service, carefully calculated everything; with the aid of scientists they thought things out; and they reported to the RVSN's commander-in-chief. Soon they received the "OK" signal to proceed with the experiments.

By placing an extended, cumulative blasting charge in direct proximity to the bottom of the silo, they achieved a ring-shaped cross-section of the shaft and thereby weakened its connection with the ground. Then they packed in the principal blasting charge—1.5-3 tonnes of TNT (depending on the system involved). It was packed with dirt from above in order to slow down the action. The explosion turned out to be so controlled that its safety radius was only 200-300 meters. In this case it did not go beyond the outer limits of the missile site. That is why the inhabitants of the little village lost in the remote hinterlands of Tver Oblast near the place where the latest experiment was held did not even hear the explosion, although they had been informed by the military ahead of time, and—to prepare for any eventuality—had taped up their windows with paper or cardboard strips.

The first and second blasts did not disappoint anybody's expectations, and the third one provided 100 percent of the desired result. The protective assembly with its foundation, the silo socket or shell—20 meters in length, together with the structural components (almost entirely intact) were thrown out to the side of the siding which leads up the the silo.

The total weight of the pure metal is more than 180 tonnes. Without any additional expenditure of efforts or money, people can proceed directly to the site and begin to cut it up and then transport it to the processing enterprises. Moreover, it has been planned to assign this part of the operations to the "Vozvratnyye resursy" [Recycled Resources] joint-stock company, which has concluded an appropriate contract with the missile

people. Because, after all, it was specifically these specialists who—at one time—built and installed these silo-type systems.

But what about the ecology involved here? In order to exercise monitoring controls and a comprehensive evaluation of the effect of the blasts on the environment, specialists of the Russian Federation's environmental-protection organs, as recommended by the General Staff, were recruited. They took test samples of the water, soil, etc. both before and after the blasting; and their conclusions turned out to be most encouraging. The crater left after the explosion was not large. After recultivation, which is being very skillfully done by the staff "ecological" subdivisions of the missile people, the land—if it is arable—will be fertile, or it may be suitable for pasturing.

Now as to the economic advantages. Not many persons are needed for carrying out the blasting. It can be handled by 2-3 blasters along with 5-7 military-service personnel providing "technical services." They will require no special instruction or training. The blasting operations themselves will require only just as much TNT as needed for each silo involved. And we need hardly explain how much money will be brought in by tens of thousands of tonnes of "salvaged" metal, a considerable portion of which will be high-alloy, "ship-type" steel. People in the West are paying a great deal of money for it. Moreover, there are many things here that would be well-suited for our economy as well: steel, highly refined precious metals, kilometers of cable, specialized technological or engineering equipment...everything which, in accordance with the agreement made with the Americans, could be released for practical, business purposes. Moreover, a portion of the money earned would accrue to the missile people, which would, obviously, not be superfluous for solving some urgent social programs.

In short, the blasting method turned out to be truly creative and unique. The documents have already been prepared to formulate it as a discovery in the blasting business. Such a discovery will be suitable not only for the military and not only for us. High marks were accorded to the missile people's experiments by the Russian Federation's Ministry of Health and Ministry of Ecology, Gostekhnadzor, Goskomsanepidemnadzor, the General Staff of the Russian Federation's Armed Forces, the Nizhnegorod Scientific Research Institute of Labor Hygiene and Occupational Diseases, the Biophysics Institute of the Russian Ministry of Health, as well as other institutions and departments. This discovery would have been made earlier—back during the time when the INF Treaty was being implemented, but at that time the missile people were so tightly pressed by deadlines and conditions that they did agree to "creative detonations"; everything had to be blown to smithereens. Now this will not happen.

Republics' Role Said 'Complicating Factor' in START

LD0910203592 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1910 GMT 8 Oct 92

[Boris Belitskiy commentary]

[Excerpts] The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, known as START, was signed last year by the then-still-existing Soviet Union and the United States. [passage omitted]

The ratification of the treaty by the United States Senate this time is particularly important because in the event of any delay, the ratification could have got snarled up in next month's presidential elections in the United States. Now it's up to Russia to follow suit, and a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman has made it known that efforts will be made to speed up the ratification process in Russia's parliament.

There is, however, one complicating factor: The treaty also has to be debated and [word indistinct] by the parliaments of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, three former Republics of the former USSR where nuclear arms were deployed by the Soviet strategic planners. This naturally requires agreement between Russia and those three former Republics of the USSR, and while talks on the subject with Kazakhstan and Belarus have made good progress, the talks with Ukraine at the military level have been unsuccessful and have had to be placed in the hands of their presidents. They will undoubtedly be discussing this matter at the summit meeting of the leaders of the Commonwealth of Independent States about to begin in Bishkek, the Kyrgyz capital.

Meanwhile, the commander in chief of the Joint Commonwealth Armed Forces, Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, has expressed the view that nuclear arms should be the responsibility of one state—Russia. And he was prepared, he said, to turn over the nuclear briefcase to Russia's Defense Ministry, provided this had the consent of the other Commonwealth member-states. This attitude, he added, had the backing of the president of Russia and his defense minister. How this would affect his own status, the marshal concluded, was irrelevant. The summit about to begin in Bishkek is thus of considerable importance to the START ratification process.

Another major problem in implementing the arms cuts stipulated in the START treaty will be the costs. Disarmament, it has now become clear, costs money, and a lot of money. The cuts stipulated in the treaty involve very costly changes in the delicate balances between the components of what is called the nuclear triad, the three arms of the forces that possess nuclear arms. Some members of Russia's parliament have in this connection voiced serious doubts as to whether the country will be able to support the heavy burden of arms cuts according to the START scenario. Well, such are just some of the problems that will have to be solved for this important treaty to come into effect.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Ukraine, Russia Disagree Over Control of Space Facilities

*LD0610002492 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1900 GMT 4 Oct 92*

[From the "Itogi" newscast]

[Text] In the wake of the problems with the Black Sea Fleet, another cause for serious conversation has cropped up recently in relations between Ukraine and Russia. It again concerns the armed forces. At issue are military space forces, or more precisely, three military space units located on the territory of Ukraine, in Dunayevtsy, Simferopol, and Yevpatoriya.

In a nutshell, here is the essence of the conflict. All spacecraft, from the first artificial earth satellite launched 35 years ago to the Mir station and the spy satellites, have always been controlled by the Soviet Army. Now it no longer exists, and the task has been taken over by the Russian Army. Those same three military units, which have through the will of history become Ukrainian, have ended up excluded from the overall system for controlling everything that flies in space—excluded on orders from Moscow.

The soldiers and officers have been left with nothing to do. Specialists say nothing demoralizes an army like idleness, and highly complex electronic equipment taken out of operation for several months cannot be restored for many years. All of this is understood in Ukraine, and in the hope of restoring former relations, Kiev is continuing to finance the idle units. The soldiers keep in good physical shape, and the officers keep the equipment chugging along so nothing breaks down.

At the same time the Ukrainian Defense Ministry continues to insist on the impossibility of any kind of command over these units from Moscow. But the inflexibility of the Kiev military chiefs is probably also determined, apart from political motives, by the fact that Ukraine has already named itself a space power, and the elimination or redesignation of existing space structures would reflect on the prestige of the state. Both sides are reluctant to forego their principles.

[Begin Lieutenant General Lopata, Ukrainian deputy defense minister, recording] The space control centers on the territory of Ukraine are an asset of the world community. Attempts to exclude them from the loop controlling space objects are ill-informed. I think that both the world community and the leaderships of Russia and Ukraine will react correctly to attempts by individual officials to resolve their private problems in this way. [end recording]

Arguments within the military, whatever their cause, are as a rule resolved by diplomats. Generals in both Kiev

and Moscow are hoping that the presidents of the two countries will discuss this problem next week in Bishkek.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Transcaucasus Deputy on Reducing Military District

*PM0210110192 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 29 Sep 92 First Edition p 7*

[David Mdivani report under the "Problem" rubric: "People Are Leaving, But the Equipment Remains"]

[Text] In a couple of months the Transcaucasus Military District is to be transformed into the Southern Group of Forces. This will entail a 60-percent reduction in management structures and an almost 50 percent reduction in the number of personnel billeted in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.

In the opinion of military specialists, this reduction will appreciably weaken the southern salient. The national armies being set up in the three Transcaucasian republics will hardly be able to achieve the level of combat efficiency of the former Soviet Army in the near future. First, they do not possess the latest weapons. Second, in the case of many categories of troops the republics do not have highly qualified specialists.

"The process of reduction is already under way. The transfer of combat equipment has also begun." Lieutenant General Sufiyan Beppayev, the district's deputy commander, says. "Whereas in the case of the transfer of combat equipment intergovernmental agreements and treaties exist which spell everything out, and we only have to fulfill orders, things are significantly more complicated as regards the evacuation of servicemen's families. In recent times alone around 3,000 families have been evacuated. Next in line are around 70 families from Armenia and around 200 from Georgia. There are no more awaiting evacuation in Azerbaijan. The work can be considered virtually complete, but it has not brought any satisfaction. Conditions have not been prepared in the new places of deployment, and many officers are forced to send their families to stay temporarily with relatives or friends. The local organs of power are not providing officers with apartments. Perhaps only the top people in Stavropol and Krasnoyarsk Krays and in Kursk are deserving of praise. If we do manage to solve the problem entirely, it will not be before 1995."

[Mdivani] Combat equipment is being released. What proportion is being passed on to Georgian armed formations?

[Beppayev] In the order of 50 percent, on average. To date the transfer of the property of the Akhaltsikhe Motorized Infantry Division has been carried out. And, as always, we were caught in the crossfire. One side reproaches us for handing over the latest models, the other for handing over obsolete equipment. Indeed, the

equipment did not represent the latest modifications, but it was in a good condition. As for the latest weapons, this question is at the decision stage, but not at our level. According to our information, the equipment handed over to the Georgian Government has not left its places of permanent deployment, and has taken no part in the Abkhaz conflict. The Georgian side has sufficient forces even without it to carry out operations.

2d Group of Russian Troops Withdrawing From Moldova

*OW3009181392 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1717 GMT 30 Sep 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Preparations have been completed in Chisinau to withdraw the 300th Russian landing regiment located there. Military sources in the Moldovan capital report that a second echelon is being organized to send technical equipment and the regiment's personnel to their new place of deployment in the capitol of Khakasiya (a republic in the Russian Federation in southeastern Siberia), Abakan. The first echelon has already arrived there. In accordance with an agreement between Russia and Moldova, ammunition and about 50% of the regiment's equipment will be given to the Moldovan national army.

The second echelon will leave Moldova by October 16, and on October 26 the personnel and banner of the 300th regiment will be sent by military transport plane to Abakan.

Reports on Russian Troop Pullout From Lithuania

First Equipment Shipments Depart

*PM3009161392 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
1 Oct 92 Morning Edition p 1*

[Report by Nikolay Lashkevich: "First Trainloads of Combat Equipment Leave Vilnius"]

[Text] Vilnius—Three weeks after the signing in Moscow of a number of interstate treaties, including the schedule for the withdrawal of Russian forces from Lithuania, the first trainloads of combat equipment and armaments belonging to the 107th motorized rifle division have started leaving Vilnius. The Lithuanian delegation was very insistent on its first-stage withdrawal.

Last week two trainloads of military hardware and equipment were withdrawn and on Tuesday another 61 items of combat equipment left by railroad, so Russia currently is meeting its commitment to withdraw military subunits from the Lithuanian capital before the end of November. I would point out that this is the division that helped Moscow and local putschists by sending in tanks and taking the television and radio company committee building and television tower in the early hours of 13 January 1991. Therefore Lithuania attaches enormous significance to the relocation of the units of

the so-called "northern camp," now under way. Incidentally, V. Landsbergis has issued an order to prepare a plan to clear the square outside parliament of the barricades that still enclose the building, but to leave some of the chunks of rock and ferroconcrete as items of "historical value." All this will be done once the 107th division has left Vilnius.

The more consistent and systematic process of withdrawal of forces from Lithuania which, as is well known, is to end on 31 August next year, is hampered by the fact that the political treaty on the withdrawal of forces remains unsigned. It is still unclear whether Russia, as Lithuania demands, will help it rebuild the republic's defense capability, which was destroyed in 1940, and whether it will hand over military property and some of the armaments as compensation for the damage that has been caused (Lithuania formerly insisted on compensation of 150 billion rubles [R] for the material damage). It looks like the meeting between V. Landsbergis and B. Yeltsin will not be taking place at the beginning of October.

While the top people are unable to finally agree among themselves, a common language is being found at a lower level. According to information from Kaliningrad, the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defense and the Baltic Fleet, with the permission of the Russian Defense Ministry, were able to sign a treaty whereby the fleet will transfer four ships to Lithuania—two torpedo boats and two small antisubmarine warfare ships and armaments for them—and construction workers from Kaunas are pledging to build a residential development in Kaliningrad to provide more than 2,500 apartments. On the other hand, the lack of political agreement is leading to unpleasant misunderstandings and incidents.

Landsbergis Reports Progress

*WS0910130892 Vilnius ELTA NEWS BULLETIN
in English 1400 GMT 8 Oct 92*

[Text] 8 October 1992—"This month the Russian troops' withdrawal from Lithuania has been carried into effect in good order and the pullout of the 107th division from Vilnius has got under way too thus marking the official start of the withdrawal as it had been agreed upon before", Vytautas Landsbergis has observed. "The good will and the desire to reach agreement manifested by both countries have proved to be of paramount significance. The bilateral agreements signed in Moscow on 8 September 1992 constitute implementation of the Helsinki Summit resolution. The bilateral agreements between the Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Federation have come into force since the day they were signed and on 28 September 1992 they were registered with the United Nations Organization. Such a course of events promises well that the tension and illegality proceeding from the presence of the foreign military forces in Lithuania will be terminated within the period set in the signed agreements". However, Vytautas Landsbergis has pointed out that these days the commanders of

some military units which are now being withdrawn assert that they have been instructed to halt the return of the military objects to the authorities of Lithuania.

Lithuanian, Russian Envoys Confer

WS1310130492 Vilnius ELTA NEWS BULLETIN in English 1919 GMT 12 Oct 92

[Text] 12 October 1992— Behind closed doors in Vilnius on October 9, Vice Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania Ceslovas Stankevicius and the Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the Russian Federation Viktor Isakov discussed the possibility of signing the prearranged interstate agreements on the progression of the withdrawal from Lithuania of the ex-Soviet armed forces which are now under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation.

Estonian Defense Minister Optimistic About Russian Troop Withdrawal

LD0110181892 Tallinn Radio Estonia in English 1620 GMT 1 Oct 92

[Excerpt] The Estonian defense minister is optimistic about troop withdrawal. Russian troops will leave Estonia even more quickly than expected.

Estonian Defense Minister Ulo Uluots made the statement on a press conference on Thursday [1 October]. Mr. Uluots said that Russia was having great difficulties in paying the salaries of officers in hard currency. [passage indistinct].

Russia has said it will pull out its troops from Estonia by 1994. Estonia has been insisting on the July 1993 deadline.

The Estonian defense minister also said that the Russian Army units in Estonia don't pose actual threats any more. He added that the question was purely a political one. [passage omitted]

Russian Troop Withdrawal From Poland To Be Completed Early

LD0210182692 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1614 GMT 2 Oct 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Potemkin]

[Text] Warsaw October 2 TASS—The agreements reached during the negotiations of Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Polish leader Lech Walesa in Moscow, have enabled both states to begin practical solution of problems in bilateral relations, a meeting of visiting Acting Russian Government Head Yegor Gaydar and the Polish president was told here today.

The sides stressed with satisfaction the documents signed during Gaydar's stay in the Polish capital consolidate both countries' striving for the creation of a new legal basis of the Russian-Polish economic relations to correspond to the market conditions.

The meeting touched upon the Russian troops withdrawal from Poland. It was noted the Russian side strictly abides by its commitments.

The Polish president was told the withdrawal of the Northern Group of Forces from Poland will be completed ahead of schedule—before the set date of November 15, 1992, to meet the Polish side's wish.

A special attention at the meeting was given to settlement of Russian and Polish mutual debts. Walesa stressed the Polish adherence to the so-called null variant of this problem's solution. New Russian proposals on the issue meet the partners' plans on mutual payment settlement.

The meeting noted the joint statement of the Russian and Polish presidents to denounce totalitarian regime repressions has contributed to the creation of a new climate in mutual relations. It was pointed to the two sides' striving to commemorate Russian and Polish soldiers, other citizens, whose monuments, cemeteries and burial places are located on territory of the two countries.

Walesa confirmed the invitation to Boris Yeltsin to come to Poland on an official visit. He also suggested to nominate his personal representative under the Russian president and establish the same post under the Polish president.

In his words, this will facilitate contacts between the two presidents on important issues.

Permission Required for Russian Units To Transit Latvia

OW0610175292 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1630 GMT 6 Oct 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The issues of transfer of the Russian Army materiel and supervision over the transit of the Russian Army units on the territory of the republic were addressed Monday [5 October] in Riga at the meeting of Latvia's Government executives and representatives of the North-Western Group of Forces of the Russian Army. According to the information carried by the Latvian daily "DIENA", the participants of the meeting also considered several points relating to the next round of the Russian-Latvian talks in Moscow scheduled for mid-October.

In an interview for the "DIENA", Mintauts Ducmanis, spokesman for the Latvian Government, reminded that by the decision of the Russian Government dated October 9 the representatives of the Russian troops stationed in the republic will be obliged to receive special permits for the transit of the Army vehicles there. By October 10, respective authorities of the Latvian defense structures will have to authenticate travel documents of

the Russian military vehicles and advise the drivers of the expediency to receive permits for their transit.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Ecologist Warns of Upcoming Nuclear Tests

LD0310170392 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*
1523 GMT 30 Sep 92

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Vladimir Anufriyev]

[Text] Arkhangelsk September 30 TASS—Russia is going to hold one or two nuclear tests before the end of this year on the Novaya Zemlya archipelago, ecology activist Aleksandr Yemelyanenko told a news conference on Wednesday [30 September].

In order to warn the public of the threat the move will bring to ecology and the population of the northern territory, environmentalists are planning to launch an international conference entitled "The Ecological Problems of the Arctic and the Prospects of Nuclear Disarmament." The conference is scheduled to take place on October 14-18 this year.

Taking part in the conference will be the designers of nuclear weaponry, victims of nuclear tests and accidents and representatives of non-governmental and public organisations supporting the idea of banning nuclear tests completely, Yemelyanenko said.

Grachev: Novaya Zemlya Nuclear Tests May Resume

LD1310190792 Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian* 1735 GMT 13 Oct 92

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Mikhail Shevtsov]

[Text] Moscow, 13 Oct—"If the United States joins the Russian unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests, which expires this month, then Russia will only welcome this decision," Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev stated here today at a meeting with Russian and foreign journalists. Russia is not going to carry out a single nuclear nuclear explosion in 1992.

The question of carrying out nuclear explosions on Novaya Zemlya in 1993 has not yet been discussed, the minister noted. However, he considers that Russia's unilateral moratorium cannot remain in force indefinitely. Every type of weapon needs constant improvement and testing. Grachev intends to put forward for examination by the Russian president and parliament a proposal to resume nuclear tests on Novaya Zemlya in limited numbers—two to three explosions per year. If tests are resumed then it will not be earlier than mid-1993, the defense minister stated.

Touching on the state of the nuclear test site on Novaya Zemlya, Pavel Grachev noted that on the ecological level, the situation there is not as dangerous as reported

in some of the mass media. He said that at the site of the most recent nuclear weapon test which he visited recently the background radiation was 14 milliroentgen per hour. From the technical viewpoint the test site meets the necessary requirements. Decisions have been made to reduce the number of troops on Novaya Zemlya. In particular the number of radio-technical companies, some divisions of the anti-aircraft missile regiment, and air defense aircraft units will be reduced.

Parliamentarians Inspect Novaya Zemlya Site

OW1310150992 Moscow *INTERFAX in English*
1429 GMT 13 Oct 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The 87 atmospheric and 3 underwater nuclear tests carried out from 1955 till 1962 largely accounted for nuclear contamination in the region of the Novaya Zemlya testing ground. The 42 underwater nuclear tests, carried out from 1964 to the 1990s did not cause the radiological situation to deteriorate seriously. This information was revealed on Tuesday [13 October] by Valeriy Menshikov, vice-chairman of the Russian parliament's Committee for Ecology and Natural Resources who led the parliamentary group which visited Novaya Zemlya on October 6 to 8.

He said that the radiation situation is mostly favorable in the region and that the radiation levels were even lower than in Moscow—9 to 17 micro-RAD. However, this conclusion does not refer to three areas with higher radiation levels. Menshikov said that the final conclusions will be made following a comprehensive ecological analysis.

According to "unofficial information concerning the place where radioactive wastes are buried", it is within the 12-mile zone, which means that it is within the limits of the Russian border. He noted at the same time that to this day the dumping of nuclear wastes in the Kara and Barents seas are not controlled.

"The most painful problem is the need to carry out ecological checks in the Yamal Peninsula and in the Yamal-Nenets autonomous district," he said.

Menshikov noted, answering IF [INTERFAX]'s question, that the Novaya Zemlya archipelago and the adjacent regions cannot be automatically put on a par with the regions affected by Chernobyl and that the ecological programme will not apply to them.

Secretary of the parliamentary Committee for Defence and Security Valeriy Shuykov announced during the press conference that on October 28 the parliament will hold hearings on nuclear tests. The MPs intend to send an inquiry to the government, requesting exhaustive information on the radiation levels in the Novaya Zemlya region.

The speakers stated that during the next nine months, Russia will not carry out nuclear tests in Novaya Zemlya. The future of nuclear tests, they said, will depend on joint decisions to be taken by the three major nuclear powers—the US, France and Russia.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Continued Russian Work on Binary CW Alleged

924P0186A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No 38, 20 Sep 92 p 16

[Article by Vil Mirzayanov and Lev Fedorov, doctors of chemical science, under the rubric "Conversion": "Scandal—Poisoned Policy"]

[Text] Scientists claim:

—The international statements of our country have differed and differ from the real output and testing of chemical weapons.

—Poisoning threatens Moscow.

—Chemical generals are once again in power.

[Begin boxed portion] DOSSIER

Chronology of the conclusion of treaties and conventions on chemical weapons:

17 June 1925 (Geneva). Protocol on a ban on the employment of asphyxiating poisonous or other such gases and bacteriological agents in war.

End of summer-beginning of autumn 1992 (Geneva). Draft convention adopted on a ban on the development, production, stockpiling, and employment of chemical weapons and their destruction.

The text was sent to the 47th conference of the UN General Assembly for signature. [End boxed portion]

It is already widely known now that chemical weapons (KhO) have been forged in Moscow incessantly for many decades. It is true that refined attempts are made sometimes to reduce this work only to the creation of toxic chemical agents (OV) planned for employment on battlefields somewhere far from our borders. We want to caution immediately: Many of the kind of agents that have already been produced in this country are not toxic, are in service, but more often are not in service (they live quietly in experimental batches), but nevertheless are especially dangerous. This latter is also corroborated by the fact that in the many years of tedium under the title "international negotiations on banning chemical weapons," so dear to our travelling chiefs, all these "noncombat" substances are a legitimate subject of discussion.

While not a reproach of the past, it is worth mentioning the statement of Soviet scientists of 8 May 1982: "Adhering strictly to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the USSR has never employed chemical weapons anywhere and has

never transmitted them to other countries." They were employed only on our own battlefields. The last time this happened was in Tbilisi in the spring of 1989, where "CS" gas fully demonstrated its effectiveness. They were also readied for the fumigation of the White House in August of 1991.

However, weapons being what they are, we always tried to be politically clean. Back in April 1982 SOMEONE made a statement to DER SPIEGEL: "There is absolutely no necessity for the Soviet Union to respond to the escalation of chemical weapons with an escalation in this sphere." This was the official rebuff to the American program for the development and production of a new variety of chemical weapons—binary. But then a decade later SOMEONE declared, after a regular meeting in Geneva, that in 1987 we completely halted the production of toxic chemical agents (IZVESTIYA, 27 August 1992).

Well, all this sounds like a hymn to humanism and common sense. But now let us turn to the prose, without which we cannot do in describing our dirty activity.

In the State Union Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology (GSNIIOKhT) a new toxic chemical agent was created. In its craftiness ("combat characteristics") it appreciably surpassed the well-known VX, and its affection is practically incurable. In any case, people who at one time were exposed to the influence of the toxic chemical agent became disabled invalids. But, also, a truly binary weapon was developed on the basis of the new toxic chemical agent. And not only developed, but also successfully completed with the output of industrial batches, after which awards were given to nonparticipants (along with the actual creators). There was also a kind of crowning with diplomas and badges of laureates of the Lenin prize for our heroes.

This was done personally by President M. Gorbachev after the output of industrial batches of the new toxic chemical agent in spring 1991. By that time he had already done everything to achieve immortality—he signed the celebrated "Bush-Gorbachev" chemical weapons agreement, and was awarded the title of Nobel Peace Prize Laureate. We will mention the names of two of the most notable recipients of that Lenin prize—V. Petrunin, the director of GSNIIOKhT, and the deputy chief of the Chemical Troops, and we will also call him SOMEONE (he is one of a number of those who latched onto it, we will not talk about the real creators—after all, a job is a job).

However, this also was not the end. In the first quarter of 1992 range tests on a new binary toxic chemical agent were completed. This was not done in "exposed" Shikhany (it became too much of a hassle to cover up from American satellites), but on the chemical test range on Plato Ustyurt near the city of Nukus. Correspondents at this range even came across—absolutely accidentally—General S. Petrov, chief of the Chemical Troops, and listened to the words of the local commander, befitting the event, about phosphorous toxic chemical

agents—Sarin, Soman, and VX—in the past, of course; the conversation did not broach the new toxic chemical agent (TRUD, 15 April 1992).

And here we cannot avoid pondering a subject that goes back to the earliest times, about who is the boss here in Rus. The first industrial batch of the toxic chemical agent was produced in Volgograd, but the Lenin prize was awarded in Moscow, even before we elected Boris Yeltsin as our first president. However, field tests of the toxic chemical agent were conducted by the Chemical Troops AFTER this election and his well-known statement of 29 January 1992 (**"Russia adheres to the agreement with the United States on the nonproduction and destruction of chemical weapons signed in 1990"**). Incidentally, those tests were conducted in another state, and it is not at all a fact that Islam Karimov, the president of that state, knew about them.

This is the regrettable result of the five-year plan that we lived through after the proclamation of the cessation of work on the creation of chemical weapons and before the completion of tests of the most powerful variety. Now we have an achievement: The Russian binary turned out to be more effective than the American.

And so?

We will start with the fact that GSNIIOKhT is in a literal sense poisoning Muscovites. Because there are practically no filters in this scientific research institute for ventilating wastes, and all of the evaporating toxic chemical agents fly directly into Moscow's air. The decontamination of modern phosphoric toxic chemical agents, with which GSNIIOKhT works to our day, is not as effective as is written by some authors of secret dissertations. Available data unequivocally show that neither the new toxic chemical agent—the pride of our generals—nor even those that are already well known (Sarin, Soman, and VX) can be successfully completely decontaminated. At a level of quite small but unsafe concentrations they "live" for weeks and months in decontamination solutions. This is what Muscovites have to contend with every day.

Incidentally, the practice followed in GSNIIOKhT in the utilization of wastes is unsafe for working personnel as well as for citizens who absolutely do not participate in this. They are stored in the open air in barrels, and afterwards transported as conventional freight by railroad to Shikhany (Saratov Oblast), where the contents are simply poured into a hole in an open field.

It is not out of place to dig even deeper into the history of this shady enterprise. The fact is that the entire huge territory of GSNIIOKhT is in a literal sense polluted by toxic chemical agents of the mustard gas type. All of the wastes, and even the toxic chemical agent itself, were poured right into the ground and buried anywhere. But after all, these substances are preserved in the soil for an indefinitely long time, slowly migrating under the influence of atmospheric sediment into subsoil waters that later mix with deeper waters. It can be asserted with a

great degree of probability that the artesian wells here are poisoned. Thus, chromatographic analysis of the pipeline water of building No. 7, which is fed water from the artesian well on the territory of the institute, showed the presence of a whole bunch of sulfuric and chlorine compounds that are close in structure to mustard gas. The management of the institute knows all of this very well, and that is why the land work on the territory is being conducted on the level of combat operations, where they are not even averse to using gas masks. All of this is carefully concealed.

In 1990 GSNIIOKhT was visited by the first deputy chairman of the Moscow Soviet, who was touched by the sight of test mice, promised to help in every way, and kept his word. However, one cannot help but be amazed as to why the representative of the Muscovites, S. Stankevich, on visiting the world's largest organization for the creation of chemical weapons, did not even think of showing an interest in the amount of lethal substances that were stored in the depot at that time! Usually there are no less than 8-10 kilograms here, and this is enough for Moscow, if there were a fire in the institute, or some other unpleasantness. Four years have already gone by since Chernobyl.

Several years ago SOMEONE assured the residents of Chapayevsk on oath that all of the gasiform wastes at the plant will pass through a special filter after the destruction of chemical weapons. One can only be surprised by the courage, acumen, and instinct for self-preservation of the residents, who did not believe this. They proved to be right: GSNIIOKhT simply did not plan for these filters.

This is the ignominious way in which we began our journey to a world without chemical weapons, whose possessors we became thanks to the homegrown military-industrial complex. Instead of destroying the old ones they will lapse into the development of new weapons, and they do this much better. It appears that the real bosses of the military-chemical branch of the military-industrial complex—the generals and the directors—will not permit their work to slacken. Accordingly, the Russians have no reason at all to entrust the destruction of chemical weapons to those who developed them.

Here it is worth pondering once more the purport of that dollar assistance after which SOMEONE went beyond the ocean not long ago. Knowing our inglorious military-chemical past, it is possible to say that the \$25 million which the United States allocated to Russia to implement the chemical weapons destruction program at the first opportunity will be spent on another program—keeping the military-industrial complex afloat, including prolonging the future development and perfection of new types of chemical weapons. Not long ago, Russians were tickled by an appointment—A. Kuntsevich, an ordinary Soviet person and Hero of Labor, was confirmed for the position of manager of the committee on conventional problems of chemical and biological weapons under the president of Russia.

There are heroes in our notes—a general, for whom chemical weapons were made in the GSNIIOKhT, a person who promised in 1982 not to respond to the escalation of the American binary weapon, a specialist who assured us that the production of toxic chemical agents was stopped in 1987, a scientist who received the Lenin prize for the creation of the world's most powerful binary chemical weapon, an official who deceived the residents of Chapayevsk regarding the plant for the destruction of chemical weapons and, finally, a politician who brought dollars from the United States to continue chemical work. So, A. Kuntsevich is all of this. He is an academician and hero, a general and a laureate.

This appointment was not a mistake, but a restoration of the System. Everyone has to know this and remember it.

Mutual Biological Warfare Concerns Pondered

PM0210131792 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 29 Sep 92 p 3

[Aleksandr Golts article: "Military Biology: Hardly Any Secrets Remain. But How To Get Rid of Suspensions?"]

[Text] There are topics in journalism where everything is known in advance. For example, you have only to write "military bacteriology," and a number of denunciatory epithets against those who "in the quiet of laboratories raise silent killers and create barbarous weapons which threaten millions of people" will spring to mind unbidden. Not so long ago all this was being addressed to Japanese war criminals or those who were considered potential enemies and whose research in the sphere of military bacteriology was giving rise to suspicion. But recently, since Moscow officially admitted that for long years the former Soviet Union had engaged in forbidden activity in this sphere, my colleagues have been ready to level the same accusations at Russian military biologists.

Nevertheless, before we begin a collective denunciation, maybe we should try to ascertain just what actually happened and is happening in this sphere? It was this desire that led me to the Defense Ministry Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Protection Directorate which has just been set up.

Most Difficult Question

Were we really preparing to fight with bacteriological weapons? Do the violations of the 1972 convention consist in precisely this? I put these questions to people who have been dealing with military biology for many years.

A very curious picture comes to light. The 1972 convention that outlawed bacteriological weapons did not establish a control mechanism to monitor its provisions.

What, military biologists asked me, were we supposed to do if information was suddenly received that microbe cultures resistant to our antibiotics had been obtained in

the West via genetic engineering? How could we check that information? How could we guarantee the country's reliable protection? For any attempt to obtain data by official means was doomed to fail from the outset. Under these conditions just one thing remained: to try to create the same culture, in order then to develop a preparation that could cope with it.

What were we to do, for example, when we learned of a patent issued in a Western country? A patent for a small cluster munition which, in terms of its design, can be used only and exclusively to deliver biological weapons? They had to create a model of the same munition and ascertain its potential. What, finally, should they have done if they got hold of the field service regulations of a foreign army containing recommendations on handling biological munitions? Under conditions of military confrontation there was just one thing to do: To model possible combat operations so as to ascertain what threatens us.

What about the constant accusations against us during those years? Were they really totally groundless? Let us recall, for example, the notorious "yellow rain."

"When we learned of accusations of this kind," Medical Service Major General Valentin Yevstigneyev said, "we ran around for two days trying to find among civilian specialists scientists who knew what the mycotoxin T-2, which we were accused of using, was."

But were all the suspicions about us really groundless? I continued trying to ascertain. Alas, not all. In the mid-seventies, on the orders of the top leadership, well protected premises were constructed at certain pharmaceutical enterprises. There was no doubt about their purpose. Thanks to space reconnaissance, their existence at once became an open secret. These are real facts.

But, nonetheless, what is called forbidden activity was to a considerable extent connected precisely with the military-technical appraisal of work performed abroad in connection with the possibility of producing bacteriological weapons there.

Times Have Changed, But Concern Remains

All this is already history. Last April the Russian president signed a decree banning all research of an offensive nature. For example, all experimental technological lines, which could have been used at a particular time but were never used to produce biological weapons, have already been eliminated.

But this does not dispel the fears. The latest flareup of suspicions in the West occurred at the beginning of September. It was caused by apocryphal information provided by foreign special services to their governments. But our specialists also have just as many concerns, and they are very valid ones.

For example, many reports appear in the foreign press, pointing out that various types of pathogenic microorganisms have been accumulated in U.S. Army biological research centers in quantities greatly in excess of defense needs. Supermodern equipment has been deployed at the Dugway range for tests of bacteriological weapons. Even simple statistics convince us that it is certainly not we who are leading in the sphere of military biology.

Thus the United States spent \$100 million on military biological research in 1991, while we spent 70 million "worthless ones" [rubles] (funding of these programs has now been reduced by a further 30 percent). Approximately 400 scientists in Russia are engaged in this research, whereas in the States there are more than 600 just in one research center. In our country no more than 10 establishments are engaged in protective military programs, but almost 100 in America. There is a military bacteriology agency under each U.S. military department: the Departments of the Air Force, the Navy, and the Army. Just over 10 specialists work in the Russian Defense Ministry's directorate.

So the concern of the Russian military is, in my view, perfectly valid. Until a control mechanism exists, each of the sides will retain these suspicions.

What Control Will Be Like

So control is necessary, and we have an interest in this. But whereas for a number of years only Moscow and certain North European countries advocated the creation of such a system, today, under the new political conditions, Washington and London are ready to discuss this subject. This is seen as a positive result of the talks that Russian, British, and U.S. representatives have just had in Moscow. The foreign press hastened to interpret their results as indicating that Moscow had made unilateral concessions by opening up civilian biological projects for inspections. This is not quite right, however. Projects on U.S. and British territory will also be visited.

But this is still not the chief point. That is, so our military specialists believe, the fact that we have, after all, agreed to hold consultations on the drafting of possible control measures. Russia has perfectly definite practical proposals here. The criteria of forbidden activity were drawn up. They take into account what areas of research, what laboratory equipment, and the presence of what military structures indicate that work on creating biological weapons is being carried out. It is proposed, for example, that laboratories with a high level of protection (work with particularly dangerous microorganisms is conducted only in them) must not contain capacities or cultivators in which it would be possible to manufacture more than 5 kg of biomass of dangerous microbes.

Moreover, the way to ensure objective checks has also been thought out. Russia has proposed creating an automated expert system in order to determine whether a country, an establishment, or a private individual is violating a provision of the convention. The expert

system that exists in the United States for the tax service has been taken as an analogue. If the parameters of forbidden activity are introduced into such a system, the machinery will be able to draw its conclusion on the basis of an objective analysis. It is proposed that control functions be fulfilled, supranational organ set up under the United Nations.

But Is There a Threat?

Maybe all this is to no avail, however? For it is clear that, whatever the United States and other Western countries are preparing, the possibility of their using bacteriological weapons in a conflict is unlikely. So maybe it is not worth spending funds on control systems?

The existing situation, however, does not give grounds for complacency. Modern science presents all too great opportunities for very dangerous research. For example, it is already possible to isolate the venom of some exotic spider against which no antidote exists, and via genetic engineering to "teach" some not too dangerous bacterium to produce this poison. As a result, a lethal bacteriological weapon will appear. I will point out that perfectly noble medical research could lead to discoveries of this kind. Who will guarantee that a culture of deadly dangerous bacteria will not end up in the hands of a maniac or a terrorist?

But this is not the only thing. It is no coincidence that bacteriological weapons are called the "poor man's atom bomb." Today the CIA suspects 13 states of preparing for a bacteriological war. They are mostly states where dictatorial authoritarian regimes are in power and where there is not even a hint of public control.

Let us also not forget that in various CIS "trouble spots" the fighting sides regularly accuse each other of using chemical and bacteriological weapons. Meanwhile, it is not necessary to possess any special knowledge or supermodern equipment in order to raise a culture of very dangerous pathogenic microbes. All this obliges military biologists to analyze very attentively what is happening and to be ready to ensure your protection and mine.

Not Only About War

But army biologists have other tasks, too. It is they who create new methods for diagnosing, discovering, and identifying new pathogenic microorganisms, and it is they who help to combat outbreaks of particularly dangerous infectious diseases. And not just infections! Military specialists are now diagnosing batches of mushrooms which caused mass poisonings this fall.

But microorganisms can do not only harm. Research is now being conducted into how to obtain a superstrong thread from bacterial material. Bacteria can absorb harmful discharges on military test sites: products of explosive disintegration, fuels and lubricants, and the poisonous components of rocket fuel. So military bacteriologists do not live by war alone. But I will tell you about this next time.

West Said To 'Hoodwink' Russian on BW Concerns*PM1210093592 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Oct 92 p 3*

[Article by Vitaliy Kasyn under the rubric "From Confidential Sources": "I Bet Moscow Was Swindled"]

[Text] This fall, high-ranking representatives of the U.S. and British governments visited our country. The aim of the visit, so it was stated, amounted to a desire to urgently dispel the concern of Washington and London with regard to Russia's compliance with the Convention on Banning Biological Weapons. The concern in question was described, in particular, in an article by Jeffrey Smith, published on the front page of THE WASHINGTON POST for 31 August: "Russia Unable to Eliminate Biological Weapons Program."

The majority of Russian newspapers took up tones of alarm on this score, claiming that research being carried out in this country in the sphere of protecting the population from such weapons was leading to wholesale epidemics of the plague, anthrax, Legionnaire's disease, and tularemia. In this way the ground for contrition was prepared. And then, at the West's request, the apposite dialogue took place in Moscow 10-11 September.

"Guiltily bowing its head," Moscow officially acknowledged that such research had taken place in the Russian Federation before the decree on banning the development of bacteriological weapons, signed by Boris Yeltsin on 11 April 1992, moreover in clear violation of the 1972 convention. The impression, incidentally, arises that the consultations with specialists, after which the aforementioned decree was signed, were inadequate. Otherwise the president would have recognized that there was no longer anything to ban: The development of biological weapons of an offensive character in our country was ended long before this.

The September meeting of Russian, U.S., and British representatives was conducted behind closed doors. However, PRAVDA's correspondent managed to meet one of the participants. At his request we will call him X. He said that a telegram about the arrival of the high-ranking visitors was received two days before the meeting itself. Astounding haste! But when I asked whether our specialists could visit the United States or Britain at the same short notice, X laughed heartily: You really are naive!, he said.

In conversation with the PRAVDA correspondent our specialists expressed concern over other countries' compliance with the convention's requirements. Moreover, the meeting held in Moscow simply did not enable scientists to rid themselves of such concerns: The Russian specialists prepared a document containing entirely justified suspicions regarding the U.S. biological weapons potential. But as ill luck would have it, the

leader of our delegation, Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Berdennikov, for some reason did not find it possible to hand it to his guests officially.

X testifies that the "highlight" of the program at the meeting was the report of Mr. G. MacCaffree, lieutenant general and deputy chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The thrust of his speech was an attempt to prove... the ineffectiveness of biological weapons! The civilized countries, he said, possess the proper defense potentials.

Projecting these excessively optimistic evaluations if only onto the perimeter of Russia's troubled southern borders, you feel unprecedented complacency: Even in these times of unrest it is by no means obligatory for Russian citizens to shell out for their own native bacteriological program. With new partners in the West, Russians, it turns out, can sleep peacefully: They are guaranteed against both epidemics, and the effects of biological weapons in the event of unforeseen events. After all our best friends are the United States and Great Britain, and these civilized countries already have the proper defense potential.

I am prepared to argue, X said, that in convincing the Russian leadership that such a carefree, irresponsible attitude to this problem was possible, the West once again "hoodwinked" our politicians, and indeed, our generals.

X considers the real sensation to be an undisclosed treaty, concluded absolutely unofficially at the Moscow meeting by the top Defense Ministry functionaries of the Russian Federation, the United States, and the Britain on maintaining and continuing the projects of the biological defense program only in specialized military institutions. This is confirmed indirectly in the Russian delegation's statement that Moscow henceforth "agreed that any NONMILITARY facility could be visited at any time with a view to removing ambiguities."

How in fact is the West's distrust of Russia's civil scientific centers to be explained given its simultaneous alignment with military institutes? I would like to have posed this and other questions to Medical Services General Valentin Yevstigneyev, chief of the Bacteriological Weapons Defense Directorate. But he categorically refused to speak to PRAVDA's correspondent, diplomatically giving to understand that the U.S. and British military were now and forever the Russian military's best friends.

Nevertheless, the West still suspects that Russia is maintaining an offensive biological program. It would appear that it is this circumstance that induced B. Yeltsin in early October to give orders for an investigation to be conducted into the activity of St. Petersburg's Institute of Extra-Pure Biological Compounds with the participation of foreign scientists. It is believed that work with strains of the plague, anthrax, and botulism toxin, are being conducted within its walls...

Of course, the people involved in this article are not astrologists or soothsayers. However, it can be predicted with 100-percent accuracy that the investigation will reveal at best the mistake of U.S. intelligence. The latter has evidently confused a vaccine against the so-called "fowl plague" with bacteriological weapons.

One way or another the game is all in one half—the Russian half, on which, alas, instead of a serious national program of defense against biological weapons there is only an empty shell. No wonder Moscow has already reduced—several times, what is more—funding of research in this area. Moreover, an integral program on this score has not been developed at all in our country.

Having gone on to note that his fears are dictated by real facts, and not at all by "maniacal anti-Americanism," X mentioned that in 1969 the White House issued an official statement that it was ending research in the sphere of offensive biological weapons. In other words, the United States intimated that it had finished with this evil once and for all. Indisputably, a noble gesture on its part. But unfortunately, no one has seriously tested its authenticity.

Meanwhile, it is generally known that the Americans were pioneers in the development of the scientific principles of biological weapons: They build the plants, they created a powerful network of scientific research institutes, arsenals, and test sites, and efficient means of employing them. The question arises: What are these institutes engaged in today? Has, say, the Dugway test site in the State of Utah, where, until recently the biggest biological weapons testing complexes were situated and functioned, ceased its activity? Have the plants and technical equipment for producing biological weapons been destroyed?

Russia has no proof of this. It is known only that the U.S. Defense Department Institute of Infectious Diseases in Fort Detrich was known in the past as a center for developing biological weapons. Today, according to our information, the laboratories of this institution are supplied on a priority basis with the necessary equipment.

What, X asks, stops us from sending a group of Russian scientists and experts to the aforementioned region of the United States for the purposes of verification? After all, the border between defense and attack in the case of biological weapons is flimsy. In order, for instance, to obtain an effective vaccine against anthrax, it is necessary to possess the necessary strain of the pathogen of this illness and to conduct the relevant tests, in conditions, moreover, that are as close as possible to real. The Americans have these possibilities.

By way of an example X again referred to the activity of the institute in Fort Detrich. There are around 90 staffers there engaged in the study of toxins, of whom 25 are doctors of science. Their intense interest in the problem of toxins does not accord with the degree of the health risk to the U.S. Army's military contingents from

biological agents, especially the venoms of snakes, spiders, molluscs, and corals. So what is it all about? Is the United States expecting an all-out invasion by adders, spiders, and other poisonous vermin?

Now let us take for comparison the former Soviet Union. The "stone age" test ground on the island of Vozrozhdeniye in the Sea of Aral ceased to exist long ago, and its remains repose on the territory of the sovereign state of Kazakhstan.

There is a glaring imbalance in the sphere of biological defense weapons. The list of alarming questions for the U.S. side in fact relate to this sphere.

...The 1972 Convention on banning the development, production, storage, and use of biological weapons was signed and ratified by 112 states. Today the moment has come to enhance the effectiveness of this important international treaty. It is evidently necessary to create a multilateral control mechanism to put all signatories to the convention onto conditions of parity.

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

Russian Defense Ministry: Kurils Troop Withdrawal To Proceed

OW3009151792 Tokyo KYODO in English 1504 GMT
30 Sep 92

[Text] Moscow, Sept. 30 KYODO—The Russian Defense Ministry said Wednesday [30 September] it will carry out a complete withdrawal of Russian troops from the four disputed islands off northern Japan despite the calling off of Russian President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Japan.

The ministry's press division said in a written reply to KYODO NEWS SERVICE the pullout of all troops from the islands announced by Yeltsin will go ahead, saying it will follow "politicians' decisions."

But the ministry did not give specific timing of the withdrawal of an estimated 7,000 troops.

In May, Yeltsin told Japanese Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe in their talks in Moscow that Russia will completely withdraw its troops stationed on the islands within one or two years.

The islands off Japan's northernmost main island of Hokkaido—Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomai islets—were seized by the former Soviet Union in the closing days of World War II.

The territorial dispute has prevented both sides from concluding a peace treaty and Japan has been reluctant to provide full economic aid to Russia until it is solved.

Demilitarization of the islands is listed as the third stage of a five-stage plan of Yeltsin's to resolve the dispute.

Yeltsin was scheduled to visit Japan in mid-September but abruptly postponed the trip just before he was due to go.

He has not referred to the troops pullout since then.

Observers said the withdrawal may be postponed because of opposition from the Russian military.

Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev has said Russia would not remove the troops.

The military, which opposes returning the islands to Japan, may cite their strategic importance to delay the pullout, the observers said.

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Bomb: Cheapest Way to Avoid War

927F0292A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Aug 92
pp 1, 3

[Interview with Yuriy Alekseyevich Trutnev, academician, in Arzamas-16 by Vladimir Gubarev; date not given: "Yu. Trutnev: 'A Bomb Is the Cheapest Way to Avoid a War'"]

[Text] Vladimir Gubarev is a science journalist, author and playwright. The author of books on astronautics, nuclear physics, genetics, and the Chernobyl disaster. His plays "Sarcophagus," "Stalin's Vacation Home," and "Vilyard" are being performed in the theaters of many nations. He is now director of the "Nekos" Studio that brings together well known science journalists and Moscow University students.

Each of us has been left a legacy by Andrey Dmitriyevich. To some he has left his understanding of the world and society, to others—conscientiousness, to yet others—the courage and ability to carry on the struggle, and to all of us—the very "Sakharov peace" that has become a thrilling page in the history not only of our Motherland, but in the life of 20th Century mankind.

In addition, Yuriy Alekseyevich Trutnev has inherited the responsibility for the fate of the nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons developed under Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov's guidance. For we must not forget that he was not only a great humanitarian, but an equally great theoretical physicist. Not only were Sakharov and Trutnev colleagues, comrades-in-arms—they labored together for many years, and met for the last time just a few days prior to Sakharov's death—but more than that, they were like-minded. Of course they did not always agree, and they did have their differences, but in the end they always found a common viewpoint. Both in science and in politics. And for that reason, Yuriy Trutnev today not only holds the post at the Federal Nuclear Center of Russia once held by Sakharov, but also sits in the same

chair to the left of Khariton, the permanent science director of the center, that formerly belonged to Sakharov.

It is not easy for Yuriy Alekseyevich, as his views on nuclear arms are unusual, and have been criticized both by some colleagues and by public representatives.

Gubarev: Do you still hold your exceptional viewpoint on nuclear disarmament?

Trutnev: Why "exceptional?" I merely think as a citizen and specialist. The fact is that we've already got used to hearing "They should just be exploded," we are accused of being afraid of losing our jobs, and so on. We will never lose our jobs, even if we are no longer involved with weapons. We specialize in such a broad field—we deal with a variety of areas of physics, with technologies, with structural designs—that we will always find an application for our skills. And in part, this is already happening because of the narrowing work front. It is important to understand that arms reduction is a completely natural process. So that talks about losing jobs and "explosion mania" are often not just incompetence, but an attempt to gain political capital.

You can curse nuclear weapons and those who have dealt with military business. But you must not forget that in our world, a complex world that is seized with crises, our nation still needs to defend itself. And from my standpoint, nuclear armament is the cheapest way to deter any threats, any dangers. Nuclear weapons are political weapons as well. They force a would-be aggressor to think twice before starting a conflict with a nation that has them. And for us they have a special meaning when you understand the geopolitical position of our nation. It is fine for the United States, sitting as they do on three oceans. But we are square in the middle of a continent. And who ever told you that things are all quiet here? Remember the boundaries, the territorial claims against each other, including against Russia. I'm not talking about any imperial ambitions. I'm just stating the reality.

Gubarev: Are you concerned about the current state of affairs?

Trutnev: Of course. The crisis is deep. It looks as if it could all fall apart... I am not saying that nuclear weapons will save Russia from disintegration; but having them will still make anyone think twice before getting pretentious about us... Of course, things have lightened up for the moment, but we must live beyond the moment. And who knows what lurks in the future? At least the Americans are not ready to lay down their nuclear weapons. Arms reduction is the issue, and I believe this is the right way.

Gubarev: Have you been the ones who carried out orders? Or have you determined the nuclear strategy of the nation?

Trutnev: Of course, we have not been the determining force. But our work has influenced the behavior of

political activists. I am not trying to justify myself, and what is more, I am not at all sorry that I came here and took part in the development of nuclear weapons. We have worked to strengthen the ability of our nation to defend itself, and without sparing ourselves. Together with the entire nation, because nuclear armament is the labor of thousands. And our conscience is clean, as we had no Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And not once have there been accidents with nuclear weapons... Knock on wood!...

Gubarev: I'm with you in knocking on wood... I know that a group of specialists was recently invited to the United States, where they were shown the methods and means of dealing with such accidents; the Americans, so to speak, shared their own sad experience.

Trutnev: We are lucky to have had no such serious accidents... But what now? It seems to me that nuclear weapons will be around for a long time to come. They talk about "weapons of mass destruction," but look what happened at Dresden. How many were killed there by "carpet bombing?" About forty thousand... And this without any nuclear bomb. And what about Iraq? Of course, nuclear weapons have their own special properties, multiple-factor effects, but likewise today's kinds of weapons, I would say...

Gubarev: Are no great favor.

Trutnev: Exactly! So we have to think more broadly, not just about nuclear weapons, though they have to be reduced, of course. In my view, the future of nuclear weapons is first of all a reduction of the number of warheads, improvement of safety, especially in our nation, and the development of new, more reliable and safer types of weapons.

Gubarev: In such an event, are tests necessary?

Trutnev: Nuclear armament cannot exist without them. I sometimes hear "Couldn't a weapon be developed without testing it?" and the name of Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov is invoked. I talked with him about this just three days before he died, and he had not changed his viewpoint, though I tried to persuade him, recalling several instances from our joint research. I have a lot of respect for Andrey Dmitriyevich, I am his pupil, but in this case he is wrong. If an engineering approach is taken to weapons, we must have tests...

Incidentally and most interestingly, this is beginning to be discussed by those who have stopped working on weapons or have nothing to do with their development... In fact, the issue of testing is strongly politicized. Yes, there have been atmospheric tests. That's one thing. Underground testing is an entirely different matter. Even in our memorable conversation, Andrey Dmitriyevich acknowledged that underground nuclear explosions are safe. I state this for those who are accustomed to invoking authorities.

Gubarev: But if there are guarantees of safety?

Trutnev: We have technology that ensures absolutely no emissions. For some reason it has been classified until now, although I believe that all these data should be made public for those carrying on this big discussion about tests. What have we to hide?!

Gubarev: And so, without nuclear weapons, our situation will no longer have to survive. What will it be like?

Trutnev: It all depends on the weapons system. One doctrine states that we have no fixed enemy, i.e. we must defend ourselves on all sides.

Gubarev: Isn't that Charles de Gaulle's definition?

Trutnev: Could be. And so, the system... It seems to me that a professional army should deal with nuclear weapons. Our weapons require professionals: responsibility is needed in handling them. And a strategy of flexible restraint and flexible reaction has to be selected. These goals will be met by forces having nuclear weapons... Tactical and strategic weapons are now being discussed. But it is not a question of terminology. Unfortunately, our weapons have penetrated into forces of all kinds, i.e. they are here, there, and everywhere. This is intolerable! Nuclear forces should be under the authority of the president. Right now, as I understand it, tactical weapons for us today are strategic, especially since elimination of the standoff with the United States. You often hear "Who is getting ready to attack us now?" Following that kind of logic, neither army nor weapons are needed. The weaker we are, the more temptations others will have. That seems clear to me.

Gubarev: Yuriy Alekseyevich, there are rumors that Yeltsin's announcement of re-aiming our missiles away from U.S. cities was your idea. We know that his proposal has started up a lot of false rumors throughout the world, and some have even called it chancy.

Trutnev: I can only say that I, too, have heard the president's announcement, and that my understanding of it is different from yours. The point was to eliminate the anti-American direction, i.e. to remove the flight assignments from missiles aimed at the United States. But the press has turned it all topsy turvy, as if the missiles have been re-aimed away from cities at military targets. This is absurd, since firing at cities or military targets is the same thing; there would be radioactive contamination everywhere. But to eliminate the possibility of firing at all is something else entirely! I believe that this was a political step, an act of good will to demonstrate that we are not enemies. And honestly speaking, one might have expected a reciprocal response; but unfortunately, there was none, and U.S. missiles are aimed at us as before.

Gubarev: In our conversation, you have chanced to mention that "care must be taken to make nuclear weapons safe, especially by us." What specifically did you have in mind?

Trutnev: I was not thinking of nuclear armament per se, but of the situation that has evolved in Russia and the republics. The deterioration of discipline, the possibility of accidents in transportation, and so on. Perhaps even terrorism.

Gubarev: Because of the breakup in the nation, is there a danger, to put it mildly, of a careless attitude toward weapons?

Trutnev: No, that cannot be said. On the contrary, measures today for the prevention of such accidents are more stringent. Ambitious and fundamental work is being done by the military, and we are providing technical support.

Gubarev: You are now 64 years old. How long have you been working here?

Trutnev: For 41 years.

Gubarev: You came here as an ordinary engineer?

Trutnev: As a laboratory technician.

Gubarev: And 40 years later, what is your position?

Trutnev: First deputy science director...

Gubarev: Sometimes nuclear researchers are called "blind hawks." Is it offensive to read and hear this? After all, people do not always understand how difficult your work is.

Trutnev: Not offensive for ourselves; we've endured worse. But distressed for speculation about weapons, for the atmosphere in the nation and in science. Everyone is looking for the reasons that things have got so bad, for someone to blame. And this is an answer: the military industrial complex. They're the ones who hogged it all up... And from that comes malice, ill will, and even meanness. Isn't the cause confused with the consequence?

Gubarev: Do you believe that the advent of nuclear armament has led to a breakthrough in the natural sciences?

Trutnev: Certainly. We have had to deal with physical phenomena that would be impossible to reproduce under laboratory conditions. Tens and hundreds of millions of degrees, pressure of billions of atmospheres, densities of hundreds of thousands of grams per cubic centimeter, times of hundred millionths of a second. Of course, this has led to completely new areas of physics.

Gubarev: You are a pupil of Andrey Dmitriyevich. What kind of a man was he?

Trutnev: Not only of Andrey Dmitriyevich. But also of Zeldovich, Frank-Kamenetskiy and Khariton. I have had to study with many.

Gubarev: Which of them had the greatest influence on you?

Trutnev: On the earliest stage, when I had just arrived here, it was David Albertovich Frank-Kamenetskiy. He was an exceptionally well educated man, an intellectual. He helped me a great deal... At that time, we had small crowded rooms, and he sat opposite from me. And he simply began imperceptibly teaching me how to work. At the same time, he brought in books having nothing directly to do with our work, he might read a poem by Gumilyov in the full swing of the working day... He was like a father to us, and I drew much from him in both the scientific and worldly sense...

Gubarev: Excuse me, but Gumilyov in those times?! You were living in a closed city; they must have had you bugged not only at work, but at home as well!

Trutnev: Bugged or not, I don't know. It did not reflect on us. Furthermore, political issues were discussed among us much more openly than in the "wide world." We were working on a problem of state importance, and therefore the attitude toward us was apparently somewhat different from the rest. Freedom of thought in physics is inevitably tied up with freedom of thought in everything, including politics. We were unafraid, not "guarded" in our thinking.

Gubarev: Nevertheless, you were in a special situation.

Trutnev: Probably just for that reason. And besides all else, there were a great many intelligent people here: scientists with world-renowned names, making the atmosphere both friendly and creative. It forced us to take initiative, to be inventive, each trying to come up with a fresh idea. People were valued primarily for ideas and their development.

Gubarev: Is the "brain drain" problem far-fetched?

Trutnev: Much will depend on how events start to develop. I personally think that our people will scarcely leave, although I can't rule that out. After all, many of those who worked in Arzamas-16 have now turned up "abroad," i.e. in the Ukraine and Kazakhstan... But that's not the main thing.

Gubarev: What then?

Trutnev: I'm concerned about something else. For decades, for almost a half century, a unique scientific and engineering team was set up and worked here, joining together professionals of the most diverse specialization. This is a specific feature of nuclear weaponry, whose development brought together theoretical physicists, experimental researchers, technologists, designers, chemists, and so forth. This conglomerate is a unique phenomenon. I'm afraid that this team will fall apart in the present situation. And that would be a loss not only for Russia, but for all world science. That's the main thing that disturbs me.

Gubarev: You have met with Americans. Do they feel the same?

Trutnev: Arzamas-16 is the largest world center of science; on that they fully conc... and have a high regard for our work.

Gubarev: Isn't it strange that you are being sent to the United States?! Can they trust you, now that there are more, not to run off?

Trutnev: They have always trusted us, otherwise there would be no point. It's just that times have changed, and the "higher-ups" understand that scientific contacts have to be developed, and there is no reason for us to run off... They have finally got that straight!

Gubarev: Let's back up a bit. You have talked about Frank-Kamenetskiy. Now it's Yakov Borisovich's turn.

Trutnev: Zeldovich was something else. Of course, he was an exceptional man and a physicist. He had the ability to make the most complicated phenomena simple and understandable, literally at his fingertips... He could assess the most complicated phenomenon on the simplest model... We treated him as an eminent scientist, but there was no kind of wall between us. At work, all were equals. And when you sense the good will of a superior, when you come to him with an idea or a question about life and you know that he is bound to help and support you, it creates a special atmosphere... Yakov Borisovich was a very astute man; he loved Saltykov-Shchedrin and often quoted him. Always appropriately and to the point.

Gubarev: Did he change when he left here?

Trutnev: No. He congratulated me very cordially when I reached my fiftieth birthday. He gave a willing hand when we turned to him for help. And for our part, we never forgot him. Do you remember that he had problems? Purely political... At that time, we wrote letters in his defense to "Kommunist," but they were never published.

Gubarev: And Sakharov?

Trutnev: At first the situation was like this: we didn't know what was going on in the next department, so in the early years we did not suspect what Sakharov was doing. And then, in about 1953, or even before that, we began to interact... We worked very closely, and felt the full measure of happiness of communicating with him. We had great confidence in one another. And we talked with him about everything: from nuclear weapons to political issues... What were his characteristics? He could see the essence of a question, and already had an answer. It was mind-boggling! He was inventive, and had an enormous number of ideas. Many found sub-units and are now living on those ideas, developing them... And the idea of the first hydrogen bomb, at that time a thermonuclear device, once again, he was one of those who came up with it... In many ways, he supported our undertakings. I had a friend, Yuriy Nikolayevich Babayev; we managed to get a slightly different view of what had already been done, and came up with a new

design on which a number of articles were based, and Andrey Dmitriyevich gave us his support. Of course, we had no idea that he might leave Arzamas—what would we do without him?! But the time came when he very much wanted to leave...

Gubarev: One thing bothers me. Why was there no protest from the physicists in Arzamas-16 when Sakharov was sent to Gorkiy?

Trutnev: Indeed, there were no protests, even though everyone had a good idea that something was amiss. And for that reason, no letters were signed against Andrey Dmitriyevich, and moreover when he fell into disfavor in Moscow, we went to him, talked, reached some understanding... Why was there no protest? The answer is simple... No, it was not a question of civil cowardice. Nevertheless, we always lived under the threat of being answerable, we understood full well that the nuclear defense of the nation was on our shoulders, regardless of what political storms were brewing in the "wide world." And incidentally, Sakharov also knew this full well.

Gubarev: He held no grudge?

Trutnev: He understood everything, and knew us well... No, you have asked a hard question, and I can honestly say that there is no answer.

Gubarev: And one thing more. The house that you live in is opposite from Sakharov's, only the street separates you. Along that street, NKVD agents with dogs marched columns of prisoners. Every morning out, and in the evening back again. Did this have an effect on you? In his memoirs, Sakharov merely mentions the fact that prisoners took part in building the "Project."

Trutnev: Once in the evening I left my friends and began to cross the street. I passed between the prisoners and a guard, and suddenly he turned on me, pointing his rifle, completely brutal... I remember those columns. The prisoners worked here until 1957. I understand Sakharov, he didn't want to talk and write about this in detail. It was a tragic part of our story, for all of us without exception. We have to know and understand, but we cannot condone... It is not something to talk about, but rather to think about...

Every one of us has to have a purely personal part that is our very own. As an example, when we celebrated Sakharov's seventieth birthday, I declined from giving a speech about my reminiscences because too many people today like to talk about their closeness to him...

Gubarev: And Khariton? You've been working with him for just about half a century. What would you say is typical of Yuliy Borisovich?

Trutnev: The ability to penetrate to the most subtle essence, and very often he has called attention to what others have not noticed. It might seem as if he has been occupied with trifles. And then it turns out that these "trifles" have grown into an enormous problem. His

motto: "I have to know ten times more than I can do," which is a lot, and he is certainly right.

Gubarev: He has adhered to this all his life?

Trutnev: Of course. You know what he is doing: while I'm sitting here talking with you, he is at work. This morning we arrived from Moscow, he dropped in at his house, held a scientific-engineering council at 10:00 AM, and right now, at 8:00 PM, he is very likely familiarizing himself with documents. At 10:00 PM, the light will still be burning in his window...

Gubarev: You were with him on the train? It left at 8:40 PM... What were you doing?

Trutnev: We went to the lounge car and started a "production" meeting. We were there until 11:00 PM. Then I said that it was time to break off and get some sleep. For some reason, that has come to be my job... "You do what you want," I say, "but I'm tired." He looked at me so reproachfully, but just the same, we quit for the night... And he's already 89 years old... And sometimes he has to be torn away from his work. And, you know, it's hard for him now, his sight is failing... The lady from the first division who is supposed to get the documents goes home and waits for Yuliy Borisovich to phone. He sends a car for her, she arrives, he turns over the documents, and then takes her home... And it's been that way for years. This is a man with an amazing capacity for work! One can only wonder at his courage: the man has always devoted himself to his work. He is in extreme old age, and yet, believe me, if he gets hold of some problem, he will not let go until it is solved or clarified. One of his main characteristics is that he can persistently get to the solution of a problem that he has raised. And it is to Khariton that we are indebted in large measure for the development of nuclear weapons in our nation; after all, he is the permanent science director of the nuclear program.

Gubarev: You don't regret what you've lived through?

Trutnev: No. In our generation there was both bad and good. I try to remember the good.

Shaposhnikov Urges Russian Control of Nuclear Arms

Speaks at Paris Defense Ministers' Conference

LD3009151492 Moscow Programma Radio Odin Network in Russian 1200 GMT 30 Sep 92

[Text] Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov has spoken against outside interference in the dispute between Russia and the Ukraine on control of nuclear weapons. In a speech at the Paris conference of defense ministers,

he again stressed that strategic nuclear weapons of the former USSR should be handed over to Russia's control.

Ukraine Objects to Statement

OW0810155692 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1541 GMT 8 Oct 92

[Report by diplomatic correspondents Andrey Borodin, Dmitriy Voskoboinikov, and Igor Porshnev; from "Diplomatic Panorama"—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] An official of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry informed DP [Diplomatic Panorama] that Commander of the CIS Armed Forces Shaposhnikov's statement to the effect that Russia alone should be responsible for the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union took Ukraine quite unawares. "Before making public statements, this important problem should have been discussed first by the Ukrainian and Russian leaders and by the heads of the two other nuclear heirs of the former Soviet Union - Belarus and Kazakhstan," said the Ukrainian diplomat.

He gave to understand that Shaposhnikov's statement is likely to be discussed during the summit in Bishkek where a Ukrainian delegation, led by Kravchuk, flew out today.

He said, however, that Ukraine will not reverse its plans to become a nuclear-free state.

Tatarstan Declares Republic Nuclear Free Zone

OW0210225592 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1912 GMT 2 Oct 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Tatarstan has been declared a nuclear free zone, free of mass-destruction weapons. The resolution was prepared by the government and passed by the republic's parliament on Friday [2 October].

According to the document, Tatarstan assumes the responsibility to neither produce nor store fission materials, components designed for the production of nuclear weapons, or poison gas.

Deputies asked whether the document is in accord with the Russian Defense Ministry, but received no answer from the government.

Deputy Prime Minister of Tatarstan Ilgiz Khairullin announced at the parliamentary session that at present in Tatarstan nuclear ammunitions and means of mass destruction were neither being produced nor stored in Tatarstan.

Ukraine Rules Out Use of Strategic Nuclear Forces

*LD0210192892 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1835 GMT 2 Oct 92*

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Sergey Balykov for TASS]

[Text] Kiev, 2 Oct—Strategic nuclear forces in Ukraine are under government control, which rules out their use from anywhere on the republic's territory. This was stated today by Ukraine's Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov at a news conference for Ukrainian and foreign journalists. He noted that the Ukrainian military doctrine, the draft of which has been submitted for study by parliament, is of an exclusively defensive nature. Its principles are built on the absence of extraterritorial claims, on the nonuse of force in contentious issues, and on good-neighborly relations with other countries. Military districts have been reshaped, on the basis of which two operational commands have been organized, the reduction of conventional armed forces has begun, and monitoring the safekeeping of weapons and other military property has intensified. Morozov noted that the sale of Black Sea Fleet property is continuing. Without the Ukrainian Defense Ministry's sanction, stores of weapons, several ships from the support fleet, and a number of military installations with the plots of land they occupied have been sold. There is continuing trade in petroleum products, foodstuffs, and material property. In this connection, the minister said, a number of pieces of evidence have been passed on to the Ukrainian procuracy general.

Ukraine Briefs U.S. Official on Nuclear Policy

*LD0610210192 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1806 GMT 6 Oct 92*

[Text] Kiev October 6 UKRINFORM-TASS—Ukraine, which proclaimed its desire to be a nuclear-free country, claims the missiles deployed on its territory as its property and says it can sell independently the uranium extracted from its missile warheads in Russia.

The idea originating in the Ukrainian parliament was first aired internationally during a recent meeting in Kiev between Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Frank Wisner.

It came hot on the heels of the announced Russian plans for selling enriched uranium from missile warheads to the United States.

According to a Ukrainian Foreign Ministry spokesman, the American side which proposed to buy uranium from Russia was willing to channel part of the money paid for the goods to Ukraine.

Ukraine now has 176 strategic missiles deployed on its territory, but it has no facilities for dismantling them. The missiles have to be transported to Russia for the purpose.

The Ukrainian spokesman said Ukraine was strictly abiding by its intention to become nuclear free.

CIS Bishkek Summit Meeting Discusses Nuclear Forces

Grachev, Shaposnikov Outline Issues

*OW0710120792 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1111 GMT 7 Oct 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Representatives of all the Commonwealth's states are participating in the session of the Council of Defense Ministers of the CIS states opened on October 7 in Bishkek. Moldova and Azerbaijan have sent their supervisors. Supervisors from Georgia are expected to arrive soon.

While opening the session Ivan Korotchenya, a coordinator of the CIS working group, reported that the agenda of the session of the heads of the states and the heads of the governments scheduled for October 9 in Bishkek includes 9 military issues.

In the first half of the day the session discussed the issue on the status of the strategic nuclear forces. According to the Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, the issue on joint security is supposed to be the most difficult to solve. In his interview with an INTERFAX correspondent Marina Chernukha, he put forward a supposition that the parties will hardly manage to make an agreement on the status of the strategic nuclear forces. According to Grachev, Belarus has completely settled this issue and the terms of the nuclear forces withdrawal had even been reduced from 7 to 3 years. Russia has not solved the problem of forces withdrawal to the Russian territory with Kazakhstan yet, but there are no problems with respect to their control, command, and usage, the Russian minister emphasized. "But for the present time we cannot reach an agreement with Ukraine." Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, the commander-in-chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, told INTERFAX in his turn that, as before, Ukraine would occupy a separate position and would object to transfer of the strategic nuclear forces under Russia's jurisdiction. "I think that the presidents must solve this issues," Shaposhnikov said. According to the minister, Ukraine must announce whether it becomes a nuclear state or it must hand over the weapons under the Russian jurisdiction. But Ukraine, the commander-in-chief said, refuses to accept either this or that variant. This means that the nuclear forces are staying without any state belonging and this is dangerous for the whole world, Shaposhnikov emphasized.

Ivan Bizhan, the deputy defense minister of Ukraine, believes that the conflict situation related to the strategic forces appeared due to the intention of the CIS commander-in-chief to include into composition of the strategic forces such forces which have no connection with them."

Shaposhnikov Reviews First Day*OW0710174792 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1710 GMT 7 Oct 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Commander in Chief of the CIS Combined Armed Forces Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov has told INTERFAX in an interview that he was happy after the first day of a conference of the Council of CIS Defence ministers which took place in Bishkek. He pointed out, however, that the ministers had been unable to decide on all the matters up for discussion.

Shaposhnikov said that two agreements had been drawn up: a statute on the overall command of the CIS combined Armed Forces and the conception of military security. "A doctrine for the collective military security of the CIS states has been virtually agreed on", Shaposhnikov pointed out. "Each state is now able to formulate its military policy on the basis of this doctrine".

"Concerning the CIS strategic nuclear weapons", the marshal stressed, "we have made our position quite clear, although we have made no full decision due to the special position of Ukraine. However, we have found ways of approaching the issue. The matter has been set aside for discussion by the presidents of the four states, on the territory of which nuclear weapons are sited (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan—IF [INTERFAX] note).

The presidents of the CIS states will meet in the Kyrgyz capital on Friday.

Y. Shaposhnikov also announced that the defence ministers had discussed the situation in Tajikistan. The leadership in Dushanbe had appealed to the CIS to assist in the resolution of its internal conflict. In connection with the absence of Tajik representation in Bishkek, no decisions were made on Wednesday.

Kravchuk 'Satisfied' on Nuclear Forces*OW0810202892 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1956 GMT 8 Oct 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk has said that Ukraine is "fully satisfied with the current status of the nuclear forces". "We are not reaching for the nuclear button", Kravchuk said in an interview upon his arrival in Bishkek on October 8. "It is quite for Ukraine to have the right to block the launch of strategic missiles from its territory".

Kravchuk believes that any changes to the status of strategic nuclear forces will "do no good", but can only complicate the solution of the main problem—the ratification of the strategic arms reduction treaty.

President Nursultan Nazarbayev, of Kazakhstan, has told IF [INTERFAX] that the "CIS nuclear button was

in reliable hands". He said that the nuclear forces in the territory of Kazakhstan would "under the concluded agreements be withdrawn from there". However, President Nazarbayev did not specify deadlines for their withdrawal.

Shaposhnikov Assumes CIS Strategic Command*OW0910182092 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1720 GMT 9 Oct 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, the CIS Joint Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief, reported on Friday at a press conference in Bishkek that he would take over the functions of the CIS strategic forces Commander due to the retirement of General Maksimov because of his age. Shaposhnikov also said that the CIS states had begun working out bilateral agreements on the status of nuclear forces. According to Marshal [Shaposhnikov], Russia has already concluded such an agreement with Belarus and is ready to sign an analogous document with Kazakhstan; an appropriate agreement with Ukraine is underway. Shaposhnikov pointed out that the issue on strategic nuclear forces is to be solved in a month.

Shaposhnikov expressed the fundamental position of the CIS chief command according to which the Russian forces would not be drawn to settle armed conflicts on the territory of the Commonwealth. They would be used solely to guard strategic sites in the CIS.

Status of Ukrainian Arms 'Undecided'*OW0910144292 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1421 GMT 9 Oct 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Council of the Heads of CIS Member Nations completed discussion of items on the Bishkek agenda. The status of Ukraine's nuclear weapons remains undecided. Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk told "INTERFAX" that the "council set the status quo" at the meeting and said the status of the nation's strategic forces must be discussed further. Ukraine still has the right to control the use of strategic forces on Ukrainian territory, Kravchuk insists. The CIS presidents agreed that technical maintenance of the missiles will be conducted by Russian specialists.

At the summit General Maksimov's resignation was accepted; Maksimov was commander of CIS strategic forces and will be replaced by Marshal Shaposhnikov. Some of the commander's functions will be transferred to the Russian Defense Ministry.

The situation in Tajikistan was discussed as well. The leaders decided to add to the 201st division of Russian armed forces in Tajikistan and send the republic humanitarian aid. Kyrgyz Vice President Feliks Kulov will coordinate the aid efforts.

Ukrainian Objections Explained

LD0910012592 Kiev Ukrayinske Telebachennya
Television Network in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 9 Oct 92

[Text] Ukraine took part in the meeting in Bishkek of the CIS heads of states. Ukraine did not change its stand at the meeting and, according to President Leonid Kravchuk, will in the future develop exclusively as an independent state. Ukraine took an active part in discussing the mutual recognition of rights and regulating property relations, that is, the property of the former USSR. There were heated debates on Nazarbayev's initiatives, and it was decided that those who so desire can sign an agreement on setting up a consultative economic working commission attached to the councils of heads of states and governments. Ukraine did not sign this document.

Ukraine took part in signing only several documents concerning property and the rights of deported peoples. It also agreed to take part in the USSR-U.S. treaty on liquidating medium-range and short-range missiles and in a similar treaty on antimissile defense.

Ihor Storozhuk reported from Bishkek that Ukraine signed five documents out of 15, with many reservations and additions based on Ukraine's unwillingness to participate in any centralized structures. The documents signed regarded joint measures on providing the national economy with electricity for the winter period of 1992-1993, cooperation in measuring time and frequency, and cooperation in the sphere of information. Ukraine did not agree to take part in the common information space, and the document passed in Bishkek will be in force only until the relevant Ukrainian law is adopted. Ukraine agreed with the general decision concerning medical and social rehabilitation of Afghan veterans. However, it did not accept the program examined at the meeting. It was decided that cooperation in this sphere will be carried out on the basis of bilateral agreements.

The next meeting is to be held in Minsk on 4 December.

Kyrgyzstan's Akayev Views Summit

OW110080992 Tokyo KYODO in English 0749 GMT
11 Oct 92

[Text] Bishkek, Oct. 11 KYODO—Kyrgyzstan's President Askar Akayev said Sunday the joint command over former Soviet nuclear arsenals is likely to dissipate soon.

In an interview with KYODO NEWS SERVICE, Akayev said Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander-in-chief of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) joint forces, has formally proposed that Russia take over all former Soviet nuclear warheads.

Shaposhnikov made the proposal at a CIS summit meeting here Friday, Akayev said.

Kazakhstan and Belarus expressed their approval in principle and nonnuclear CIS member states followed suit with the aim of checking the spread of nuclear weapons, Akayev said.

But Ukraine reportedly voiced stiff opposition to the plan, saying it would be a violation of an earlier accord for the joint control of nuclear arsenals deployed in the CIS states.

Akayev said there will be bilateral negotiations between Russia and three other states of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus over transferring to Moscow's control the nuclear arsenals stored in the three other CIS states.

At a meeting of CIS defense ministers, held in Bishkek prior to the CIS summit, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev proposed that Moscow control of all strategic nuclear weapons deployed in the four former Soviet republics of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus.

Shaposhnikov News Conference

OW1210184392 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1721 GMT 12 Oct 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The CIS allied forces commander-in-chief, Air Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov believes that the general situation in the military sphere within the framework of the Commonwealth has been affected favorably, as "there has appeared clarity on the issue of conventional forces and tactical nuclear arms". Speaking at a news conference in Moscow on Monday Marshal Shaposhnikov said that "all tactical nuclear arms have already been moved to facilities in the Russian Federation".

CIS commander-in-chief has said there is no need for each state to make its armed forces part of the allied ones. However, Marshal Shaposhnikov said that in a number of areas, such as anti-aircraft defence, cooperation is possible. He recalled that at the recent Defence Ministers' Council in Bishkek he invited his CIS counterparts to draft an agreement on a standard system of anti-aircraft defence. Shaposhnikov said that the CIS defence ministers are expected to initial the treaty on November 4-5 in Moscow.

About Ukraine's special attitude to the strategic forces Shaposhnikov said the problem was in resolving property disputes, because "Kiev maintains nuclear arms are not just military hardware but a material asset having a price".

CIS commander-in-chief said that in the near future Kyrgyzstan was going to send a CIS peace-keeping force in the near future. [sentence as received] Shaposhnikov said that the 201st Russian division deployed in Tajikistan would not be included in the peace-keeping force for the time being. It would guard the essential facilities, such as the Nurek Hydro. Shaposhnikov recalled that

Tajikistan did not have an army of its own. Shaposhnikov said that "it would make sense to conclude an agreement with that republic on the temporary presence of Russian troops there".

Further on News Conference

OW1210204892 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1930 GMT 12 Oct 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] CIS CinC Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov has admitted that "the situation in the CIS strategic forces, in fact, remained the same even after the Bishkek meeting", except for the resignation of the former CIS strategic forces CinC, Yuriy Maksimov whose duties have been transferred to Marshal Shaposhnikov.

Speaking today at a press conference in Moscow, Shaposhnikov said that he had proposed to the leaders of the four CIS states having nuclear weapons within their territories to make Russia the only heir of the Soviet nuclear weapons.

Shaposhnikov believes that the nuclear states' leaders should promote the ratification of agreements on the strategic forces in the parliaments, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and measures to foster their countries' nuclear-free status (except for Russia). At the same time, the CinC asked the leaders to sign bilateral agreements (Russian-Belarusian, Russian-Kazakh, Russian-Ukrainian), setting deadlines for the withdrawal and elimination of nuclear arms. "I was understood by Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and by Ukraine, too, but not quite", Shaposhnikov said.

Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov pointed to Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk's understanding of the necessity to maintain closer cooperation with the CIS military command in the safe keeping of nuclear arms. Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov also asked Leonid Kravchuk to refrain from any steps to "perfect the administrative control" of the CIS strategic forces in Ukraine.

Belarusian Chairman Comments

LD1210221692 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1800 GMT 12 Oct 92

[Correspondent A. Zhuk report; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] The meeting in Bishkek was prepared better than previous ones, [Belarusian Supreme Soviet Chairman] Stanislav Shushkevich has noted. Journalists were particularly interested in a single monetary policy. In the opinion of [Council of Ministers Chairman] Vyacheslav Kebich, the CIS countries, if they have agreed to do so, have to take more active joint measures to increase the ruble's effectiveness as a means of payment and credit. The head of the Belarusian parliament commented on the summit decisions on military-defense issues and then set out Belarus' position on some of them.

[Begin Shushkevich recording] The schedule for the withdrawal of strategic-nuclear forces from the territory of the Republic of Belarus has now been agreed on; that is, for the withdrawal of Russian forces from the territory of the Republic of Belarus. This schedule—and I must say again that it is a preliminary one—needs to be carefully examined because it concerns the fates of many people. It involves the restationing of equipment and guaranteed safety—in general, the observation of international obligations, the observation of safety in transportation in accordance with international standards. At this point we see the timetable as two and a half years long. [end recording]

U.S.-Belarus Nuclear Arms Removal Accord in Jeopardy

OW1010174992 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1636 GMT 10 Oct 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The agreement on U.S. technical aid for removing nuclear weapons from Belarus due to be finalized in Washington on Oct 19 may not be signed after all, as the republic's deputy defence minister Aleksandr Tushinskiy has told INTERFAX in an exclusive interview. He represents Belarus in talks with the United States on this issue. The cost of materials and technology, also training and consulting by the American side amounts to \$1mn [million].

Tushinskiy explains that Belarus can't accept the wording of the clause under which the American side "bears no responsibility for the quality of work by its representatives, nor for the lives and health of Belarusian specialists working with the methods and equipment provided by American colleagues". Aleksandr Tushinskiy said that though the agreement was initialled by the two countries' defence authorities on Sept 30 in Minsk, he was not going to sign a document "which was not at all in Belarus' interests".

FRANCE

Premier Favors Closer Nuclear Ties With UK

LD0110200992 Paris France-Inter Radio Network
in French 1800 GMT 1 Oct 92

[Excerpt] Britain could become one of the pillars in the future European defense. Prime Minister Beregovoy said he favors closer links [rapprochement] between French and British nuclear forces. He said this would be a first useful step toward the adoption of a doctrine of European dissuasion.

This declaration was made by Beregovoy in Paris at the closing of an international meeting on strategy. Should we deduce from this that the Paris-London axis is to serve as a basis for military Europe, in the same way that the Paris-Bonn axis is being used as a basis for monetary Europe? [passage omitted]

Prime Minister Says France Opposes 'Star Wars'

Sees 'Unacceptable Risk'

AU0110140892 Paris AFP in English 1254 GMT
1 Oct 92

[Text] Paris, Oct 1 (AFP)—France is opposed to the U.S. strategic defense initiative (SDI), the so-called "Star Wars" space-based anti-missile defense shield, Prime Minister Pierre Beregovoy said here Thursday.

SDI "presents the unacceptable risk of reviving the arms race, militarizing space and going against the current of nuclear disarmament," Beregovoy said in a speech closing a three-day international conference on new military strategies at the defense ministry here.

This is not a personal opinion, Beregovoy said, but "the position of the French Government, determined following consultations with the president," Francois Mitterrand.

The U.S. early defense system "might appear to be interesting," Beregovoy said, but although "it could be the precursor of an international space-based control system...technical constraints limit its capacity."

France has "a range of nuclear weaponry whose diversity should allow it to face up to any situation," Beregovoy told the seminar, but "the true solution lies in the struggle against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."

Nuclear dissuasion, however, "retains all its pertinence in the current international situation," Beregovoy said.

He reiterated the new French position on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, first mentioned Monday by Defense Minister Pierre Joxe at the start of the conference.

"France intends to remain totally faithful" to NATO, but the alliance "should not remain petrified and adapt itself to the new strategic situation," he said.

Beregovoy said France was determined, "along with other countries, and particularly Germany," to ensure that the Western European Union—the E.C.'s sole military organization—"become the instrument of the European union's defense policy."

Further Report

LD0610101492 Paris LE MONDE in French
3 Oct 92 p24

[Unattributed report: "Mr. Beregovoy Reaffirms That France Does Not Support American 'Star Wars' Plan"]

[Text] Prime Minister Pierre Beregovoy said on Thursday, 1 October, that France is not in favor of the antimissile space-shield plan drawn up by the United States, when he delivered the closing speech at the international colloquium on "a new strategic debate" which was organized by the defense minister in Paris and which lasted two and one half days. Mr. Beregovoy reaffirmed the opposition to this plan which Pierre Joxe, his defense minister, expressed during a fact-finding visit to the American "star wars" headquarters in February.

"I do not think it is desirable," the prime minister explained, "to support the antimissile space-shield project. Of course, the 'early warning' aspect of this program may be interesting: It could herald an international system of monitoring and openness from space. But, in addition to the fact that its capabilities are limited by technical constraints, it presents the unacceptable risk of reviving the arms race and militarizing space, thus running counter to disarmament efforts."

Stressing that he had previously spoken with the president of the republic about the subjects of his speech, Mr. Beregovoy did not echo Mr. Joxe's previous statement about the appropriateness of France moving closer to the NATO leadership bodies. Of course, he admitted that "the Atlantic Alliance must continue to play a major role." But he immediately expressed the view that "European building must be consolidated."

"We want to continue our effort with other countries, particularly Germany," Mr. Beregovoy said, "and make the Western European Union the instrument of the European Union's defense policy. This move toward a European defense is not just necessary for us. It will one day be recognized by the countries which want to join our community and contribute to the consolidation of a center of stability on our continent."

European Deterrence

The prime minister took this opportunity to discuss "the adoption of a European deterrence doctrine," which will necessitate "more time and work." However, echoing what his defense minister said two days before him, he

pointed out that "a preliminary approach would probably consist of bringing the viewpoints of the Community's two nuclear powers—Britain and France—closer together."

After expressing the view that "the time has probably come to open up national service more broadly to civilian activities," Mr. Beregovoy launched an appeal for cooperation in the arms sphere. "The time has come," he explained, "to envisage the formation of a veritable European arms industry, by bringing our national industries closer and by cooperation on joint equipment projects. France must set an example and continue the restructuring of its arms industries, consolidating those which are vital for its own security, bringing those which are capable of manufacturing joint equipment closer to European partners, and finally encouraging those which are able to diversify their production to do so."

UNITED KINGDOM

Defense Secretary Addresses Strategic Conference in Paris

*LD3009183592 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1748 GMT 30 Sep 92*

[By PRESS ASSOCIATION defense correspondent Charles Miller]

[Text] Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind tonight urged France to forge links with the UK on nuclear defence and move closer to Nato. Behind-the-scenes negotiations have been under way for more than a year between Britain and France in a bid to find ways to co-operate on nuclear issues. France, facing a lack of resources to replace its ageing arsenal and a growing anti-nuclear lobby, is keen to move ahead with a re-arranged Euroforce. The Commons Defence Select Committee has urged greater co-operation between the UK and French

ballistic missile submarines in terms of targeting and patrol patterns. British ministers are known to support the moves but emphasise it must not be at the expense of the Americans.

Mr Rifkind told an international strategic conference in Paris that Nato would continue to exist "at the centre of our strategic thinking". "For Europe and America to develop separate security strategies would be in the interests of neither continent," he said. "Whatever the outcome of the presidential election in November, the United States Administration will remain firmly internationalist and fully aware... of its common interests with the European nations."

He is strongly opposed to France's efforts to set up a strictly European defence arm alongside Nato based on a Franco-German army corps. France left the Alliance's military structure in 1966. He urged "closer co-operation and cohesion between the two West European nuclear powers (Britain and France)".

Mr Rifkind said the two countries should co-operate on nuclear matters in the technical, financial and operational fields. "The more closely we can concert our policies, the more weight we shall carry; where we have failed to do so—as for example over nuclear testing—the outcomes tends to be to our disadvantage."

He made it clear that co-operation should serve as "a powerful underpinning to collective deterrence within the Alliance, by demonstrating identity of interest and purpose between Nato's European nuclear powers".

All of Britain's nuclear weapons are assigned to Nato and the Government has pledged its long-term commitment to the Alliance. While some elements in the French government have pressed for an Anglo-French European nuclear umbrella, Britain insists the US must not be squeezed out. Reduced links with the US would inevitably result in problems for Britain, with less intelligence and satellite information exchange affecting key areas such as targeting and surveillance.

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

30 Nov 1992